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China´s foreign policy has been radically changing from the position of passive 
observer to active policy participant. This change can be examined in various ways 
through China´s actions in bilateral relations, world politics and multilateral institutions. 
China´s changing foreign policy is well researched and highly disputed. With this thesis 
the objective is to further elaborate these changes as well as participate in the wider 
discussion over China´s foreign policy. The study partakes in the discussion through a 
detailed case study based on China´s first overseas military base in Djibouti. The case 
study answers the research questions of how does China reason the opening of the 
military base in Djibouti and how the reasons portray the changes of China´s foreign 
policy and finally what sort of implications does the opening have for the future.   
 
The study was conducted as a case study which supported open-minded and objective 
viewpoint for analysis. Official Ministry of Foreign Affairs press statements and 
People´s Daily and Global Times news articles were chosen as primary data. In total 
there were around ten official statements from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 55 news 
articles from People´s Daily and Global Times. Due to both of the primary sources 
being strictly under the rule of China´s Communist Party, the data provided insightful 
glance on China´s foreign policy. Data was further analyzed by using content analysis 
to highlight and discover themes and connections with the current foreign policy.   
 
The data suggests that while opening a military base is a new step on China´s security 
policy, the reasoning follows China´s well-established themes of non-interference and 
peaceful development. While at times contradicting, it seems unlikely that China is 
abandoning neither of these policies, but the terms´ meanings are developing and 
changing. It is likely that in the future the needs of People´s Liberation Army and 
China´s foreign policy drift further away from each other which will cause a stir. While 
Chinese base in Djibouti is unique in many ways, it can be seen as only testing ground 
for future military bases.     
 
 
Keywords: China, foreign policy, international relations, military base, Djibouti, Africa 
 
 
 
4/84 
Table of Contents 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 6 
1.1 China’s past and current foreign policies .......................................................... 9 
1.2 Djibouti and the first Chinese overseas military base .................................. 12 
1.3 First overseas military base .......................................................................... 14 
1.4 Research questions and the relevance of the research.................................. 15 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY AND DATA .................................... 17 
2.1. Introducing primary sources......................................................................... 17 
2.2. Case Study Approach ................................................................................... 18 
2.3. Collecting primary data ................................................................................ 20 
2.4. Qualitative content analysis ......................................................................... 21 
3. CHINA´S AFRICA POLICY ................................................................................ 23 
3.1. The basis of Chinese foreign policy ............................................................. 24 
3.1.1. The three discourses of friendship ................................................... 25 
3.1.2. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the non-
interference policy ........................................................................... 28 
3.2. Trade policy.................................................................................................. 32 
3.2.1. Soft loans ......................................................................................... 32 
3.3. Security policy.............................................................................................. 37 
3.3.1. China´s peacekeeping work ............................................................. 39 
3.3.2. Military related human resource programs ...................................... 41 
3.3.3. Arms deals ....................................................................................... 42 
4. DATA ANALYSIS ............................................................................................... 45 
4.1. Global responsibilities .................................................................................. 45 
4.1.1. The non-interference policy & peaceful development ..................... 46 
4.1.2. Protector of Africa and the world .................................................... 47 
4.1.3. United Nations´ peacekeeping operations ....................................... 48 
4.2. Military ......................................................................................................... 50 
4.2.1. Support base or military base? ......................................................... 50 
4.2.2. Comparing to the United States and the West ................................. 52 
4.2.3. China´s history in the Somali waters and practical challenges ........ 54 
4.3. Win-win cooperation .................................................................................... 55 
4.3.2. Protection of Chinese interests......................................................... 55 
4.3.3. Economic benefits for Djibouti ........................................................ 56 
5. DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................ 59 
5/84 
5.1. Growing military presence in Africa ............................................................ 59 
5.2. The role of global actor ................................................................................ 61 
5.3. Conflicting policies ...................................................................................... 63 
6. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 65 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 68 
FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ 84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6/84 
 
1. Introduction 
 
After Chairman Mao’s death in 1976, with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China 
launched its first economic reforms and started the opening of the country for the rest of 
the world. Since then, the economy of the world’s most populous country has 
blossomed in unimaginable ways and succeeded to lift 850 million people out of 
absolute poverty (World Bank 2019). The success of China’s economy has not only 
benefited China itself, but also the rest of the world (Golley & Song 2011, 1). China’s 
vast, ever-growing market opportunities as well as the low-cost products and workforce 
are attractive and lucrative for the world economy. While China’s economy has 
blossomed, it has also gained considerable economic and political power through its 
vast diplomatic relations around the world and especially with its connections to 
developing nations. While China’s transition from one of the world’s poorest countries 
to economic powerhouse has been on-going, China’s stance on foreign policy and its 
relative position in the world politics has become more assertive.  
 
While China’s economic achievements are commendable and necessary for the global 
economy to progress, at the same time country’s control over its own citizens is tighter 
than ever. Free internet, that was predicted to bring democracy and human rights to 
China, is under strict censorship and anyone who is found to be criticizing government 
too publicly is facing possible prosecution (Griffiths 2020). For the fear of unrests, 
Chinese government has decided to surveil and restrict the movement and livelihoods of 
the ethnic minorities of Tibetans and Uyghurs (Harris 2019, 276-277). In addition, 
according to numerous reports China has detained over one million ethnic Uyghurs to 
so called detention centers that work as reeducation centers where Uyghurs are forced to 
make confessionals, tortured and kept under constant surveillance (e.g. Maizland 2019 
& Harris 2019).These minorities’ freedom of religion, speech, language and movement 
is constantly weakening. In addition, Chinese human rights lawyers and advocates have 
disappeared and trialed without fair judgement (UN Human Rights Council 2020). 
Many western nations have been criticizing the situation of human rights in China, but 
no real actions have been taken against China due to fear of possible diplomatic dispute 
with China.  
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During the time, China has also initiated vigorous reforms to modernize the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA). Reforms have not been limited to organizational changes, but 
also extensive investments have been made to develop armament and particularly its 
navy. In a mere decade, China’s ability to develop and enlarge its navy has been nothing 
sort of astonishing (Rick 2020). As an example, some of the PLA Navy´s (PLAN) 
greatest achievements have been the release of two aircraft carriers within decade which 
itself is unseen before.  
 
Concurrently, China has been more vocal than ever about its disputes with neighboring 
countries and military advancements. Tensions have risen in the South China Sea since 
China commenced building permanent military and civilian installations on the reefs 
and rocks of the areas which fall between China’s so called nine-dash line which are 
also claimed by multiple different countries. China’s nine-dash line refers to vague area 
in the South China Sea that China claims sovereignty over. The area covers almost the 
entire South China Sea crossing over to neighboring countries’ borders. Reclaiming 
land and building on the reefs and later imposing control over them has angered not 
only neighboring countries but international audience as well (e.g. Roy 2013, Schofield 
2016 & De Castro 2012). In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Haag ruled in 
the case of Philippines vs. China that China’s claims were all groundless. China refused 
to participate in tribunal process and later dismissed the ruling (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration 2016, 2). At present, none of the disputes between China and neighboring 
countries involved has been solved and negations have come to a standstill. Despite 
condemnation of the countries involved and the international audience, China is still 
pursuing its goals in the South China Sea and continuing reclaiming and constructing on 
the reefs. 
 
Similar incidents have been also observed in the East China Sea, where China is 
conducting aggressive patrolling around Senkaku Islands (in China known as Diaoyu) 
which are controlled by Japan. This essentially means Chinese government ships 
entering Japan’s national waters without permission. Besides conventional patrolling in 
the area, Chinese fishing boats frequently enter Japanese waters to fish (Sato 2019, 61). 
Sometimes the boats are accompanied by Chinese coast guards to assert their rights in 
the areas of dispute. In addition, China announced the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013 which overlaps partly with Japanese own ADIZ and 
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has contributed to dispute. The announcement of China’s ADIZ is clearly showing a 
stronger stance against border disputes (Chang 2019, 46).  
 
Finally, in 2015 China announced the decision to establish its first overseas military 
base in Djibouti. This plan to open military base did not astound the world as 
speculations over the possible opening had been circulating around, albeit the decision 
was met with a mixed response. For some, a military base signifies a step toward 
claiming a position as military power, which China has denied furiously (People´s Daily 
2016c & Sun 2017). Djibouti leaders, on the other hand, embrace China’s decision to 
follow peaceful development path and take it as a welcome change to Western powers 
present in Djibouti (Bai 2016 & Global Times 2015a). As a result of all the above-
mentioned Chinese advancements, many describe the new Chinese foreign policy 
“assertive”, “arrogant” and even “aggressive” (Chang 2019, 32). China’s inability to 
convince the international audience of its intentions has led to vast conversations on 
“China threat” and “rising China” not only within Western media but also among 
academia all around the world (Machida 2010 and Golley & Song 2011). While China 
develops it is only natural to see changes, it is only natural and expected to see its 
foreign policy change and further develop. All the major superpowers have gone 
through multiple changes in their foreign policy through time, and so will China as well.  
 
Much have already been written about the changes in Chinese foreign policy but with 
this thesis I wish to add to the conversation by conducting a case study based on the 
establishment of China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti. With the case study, I 
want to illustrate the reasons China has given for opening the overseas military base. I 
also elaborate how the establishment reflects the current changes in policies and how 
the military base is now essential part of China’s foreign policy. The chosen primary 
data is drawn from the official statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China and the news articles from the main organs of the 
Chinese party-state: the People’s Daily and the Global Times.  
 
This thesis will introduce the results of this study in the following chapters: 1. 
Introduction, 2. Research design, methodology and data, 3. China’s African Policy, 4. 
Analysis, 5. Discussion and 6. Conclusion. In chapter 1, the topic and the research 
questions are being introduced while China-Djibouti history will also be highlighted 
getting. In chapter 2 a closer look of how the study was conducted will be taken and the 
9/84 
main methodology will be introduced. There will be also introduction of the primary 
sources. In chapter 3 the main parts of China´s African Policy are being discussed. In 
chapter 4 findings of the study will be presented under three distinctive themes and 
following subcategories. Chapter 5 discusses the concluding analysis results in more 
detail and the results of the study. Chapter 6 will be the concluding chapter that 
summarizes the study and the study results.  
 
1.1 China’s past and current foreign policies  
 
Shortly after Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 Deng Xiaoping gave the following 
advice regarding diplomatic relations: “keep cool-headed to observe, stand firmly, be 
composed to react. Hide our light and bide our time, never try to take the lead” “隐藏实
力，等待时机，绝不当头”. This advice became widely cited and is often stated to 
describe the essence of Chinese foreign policy stand starting from Mao’s era (1949-
1979) until 2012 and Party leadership by Xi Jinping. This period of China’s foreign 
policy is often interpreted as more passive and observer-like era. Chinese leaders 
remained largely loyal to Deng’s ideology until Hu Jintao’s era (2002-2012), but even 
then, Western countries requests for positive action were often met with “non-
committal” responses (Ferdinand 2016, 942). During this “hibernation” period of 
Chinese foreign policy, Western countries and especially the United States remained the 
major force in all the international institutions and discussions. 
 
Nonetheless, since 2012 new winds of change have been observed in China’s domestic 
and foreign policies. 2012 marks as a significant year as this is the year when current 
Party General Secretary Xi Jinping took office. At the time, many predicted that Xi 
would bring more open China and more rights to its citizens (e.g. McGregor 2017, 3-4). 
Reality has been much different, and China is now more controlled and closed than ever 
before. Soon after Xi took office, he launched the “China dream” “中国梦” as the 
ideological objective of his regime. Albeit, China dream was not originally initiated by 
Xi himself, he brought it officially as part of the party discourse (Ferdinand 2016, 944). 
It is applied to refer to both Chinese people’s dreams and more significantly to the 
“rejuvenation of Chinese people and China” (兴国) as a whole. From the Chinese 
government’s point of view, China dream has two objects, which are to become 
“moderately well-off society” by around 2020 and modernize and transform China into 
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a fully developed nation by around 2050 (Mohanty 2013, 34). Modernization refers here 
as “China re-establishing its position as a world leader in science and technology as 
well as in economics and business; the resurgence of Chinese civilization, culture and 
defensive strength; and China participating in all areas of human endeavor” (Kuhn, 
2014). As development and revamping have swept through all the areas of Chinese 
society and government, changes have also been made to country’s foreign policy. 
These changes are the primary focus of this thesis and how they are reflected in the 
opening of China’s first overseas military base. 
 
Before getting more into the Chinese foreign policies, it is important to understand the 
current situation of the world politics. Since the end of World War II, the United States 
has been indisputably the most powerful nation in the world in terms of military, 
finance and economy. Following the years of war, the United States capitalized its 
position as the most powerful by creating system that underpins postwar international 
order. This happened through creating international institutions such as the United 
Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, which support the current world 
order. All these institutions were created and mainly governed by the United States with 
other Western nations (Shambaugh 2017, 142).  
 
The Great Recession of 2007-2008 that shook global economy to the core did not end 
the unipolarity of the United States but was the start of its declining economic power. In 
addition, during more recent years the United States’ decisions to step away from 
positions of power have left a vacancy for many rising countries. US president Donald 
Trump’s decisions to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, UNESCO and the 
UN Human Rights Council can be stated as clear examples of the US withdrawal of 
major international bodies. All the above mentioned have left power vacuum and more 
room for other countries to rise. (Layne 2018, 91-94.) All these point to the decline of 
Western influence and power in the field of foreign policy. 
 
Due to Xi’s envisioned dream of more powerful China and newly acquired confidence 
through economic accomplishments, China’s foreign policy has entered a new era of 
confidence and this has also spilled over to the rhetoric surrounding it (Ferdinand 2016, 
948-949). In connection to China’s new foreign policy objectives, China has launched 
its most ambitious plan yet, the so-called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), “一带一路”. 
11/84 
BRI aims to enhance connectivity through Asia, Europe, Africa and Middle East by 
investing in large scale development and infrastructure projects. Today over 100 
countries and international institutions have joined the initiative. BRI is connected 
ideologically to historical Silk Road, but it is not geographically constrained, which 
means that in substance any country is welcomed to join the initiative. Ambitious plan 
will demand years to accomplish but China promises win-win benefits for all 
participating parties. (Mobley 2019, 52-53.) 
 
Despite the lack of coherence and clear motives, BRI did not appear by chance but 
through strategic planning. Chinese economic growth has considerably slowed down 
from the economic growth heydays of two digits down to more normal one-digit growth. 
Despite the continuous economic success, China needs more to develop further and 
maintain the system, and the growth especially needed to reinvigorate some not less 
successful parts of China’s economy. In fact, China’s large state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) have started to feel the pressure and fall behind. For decades SOEs have been 
given preferential treatment by government in decision making and preferential access 
to loans that have given unfair advantage compared to private companies (Li 2020, 197). 
The result is massive, complex web of unprofitable companies that play central role in 
providing employment locally in China. The closure of SOEs would bring unrest that 
local governments do not want to face (Li 2020, 192). Chinese government has been 
trying to privatize some of these companies, though it seems far more complicated than 
expected. SOEs are used also as a leverage tools when Chinese government wants to 
control economic fluctuations to more favorable direction. In order to sustain SOEs 
future, government has been passing large infrastructure projects to SOEs but as China 
moves from an investment led economy to a consumption based one, SOEs need to find 
alternative investment projects to domestic projects (Ferdinand 2016, 951). BRI projects 
are providing fitting alternative solution for declining domestic profits. Secondly, some 
suggest that China is using BRI investments to diversify its energy sources which is 
important for China’s overall security (Mobley 2019, 55). Diversifying and securing 
energy sources is important for China because it will lessen its reliance energy sources 
dominated by the United States´ allies.  
 
Due to the initiative’s vastness and lack of clear motives, the initiative has faced harsh 
criticism. The most common criticism being the way BRI projects are conducted in 
developing countries, that do not support the growth of these countries. Also, many of 
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the countries have found themselves in contracts that they are unbale to keep, which has 
led to not only economic losses but also to loss of resources and other strategic assets 
(e.g. Magnus 2018, 183). This is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. Despite the 
criticism, many of the BRI partner countries have been welcoming for Chinese 
investments that have helped them to start already long due infrastructure projects that 
some of the countries have desperately needed. BRI projects are the foundation of Xi 
Jinping’s current foreign policy and many actions of the country are connected to BRI. 
As it stands, BRI can be seen as a sort of umbrella that covers all of China’s activities 
overseas. BRI´s lack of coherence and definition allows it to flexibly apply BRI to 
everything it does. Through BRI China aims to improve its economic, political and 
security situation while developing win-win co-operation with foreign countries.  
1.2 Djibouti and the first Chinese overseas military base  
 
Djibouti is a small Eastern African country that lies in the Horn of Africa. With the 
population of only 885 000, Djibouti is one of the smallest countries in the African 
continent. With little resources and industry, Djibouti has utilized its geological position 
to its benefit. The Horn of Africa is a geopolitically significant area due to its close 
proximity to the Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal. Around 20 % of global trade goes 
through these sea routes every year (Eunafor 2019, 14). Thus, the Gulf of Aden is a 
significant waypoint between Europe, Africa, Middle East and beyond. Djibouti has 
three official languages: Somali, Arabic and French. As many neighboring African 
nations, Djibouti is a former French colony. Until country’s independence in 1977, 
Djibouti was known as French Territory of the Afars and the Issas, named after the two 
main ethnic groups in the country. Djibouti has a harsh climate and very little natural 
minerals and resources. Country’s agriculture sector is small to non-existing and 
periodic droughts have major impact on the country. As a result, the majority of food, 
water and energy must be imported from overseas. There are also no major industries 
present in Djibouti which has led the Djibouti government to rely entirely on their 
service sector to provide income and jobs for Djiboutians. Despite recent years’ large 
investments and subjacent economic growth, Djibouti still has an unemployment rate of 
40 % and most of the population is mainly unskilled with no formal education 
(Embassy of Djibouti in Washington). Djibouti’s society is highly unequal and 
segregated by ethnic division where the rich and powerful elite prosper (Antinelli 2019, 
35). 
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Figure 1. Map of Horn of Africa. Image from Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of 
Switzerland  
 
Country’s largest economic asset is its geological location, and as mentioned before, 
Djibouti has capitalized on it to its benefit. Djibouti’s strategy has been to transform 
itself to one of the world’s leading international transport hubs. Djibouti´s president 
Ismail Omar Guelleh famously said that “we want to follow the path of Singapore” in 
order to create commercial hub of Africa to Djibouti (Blair 2016). To achieve this, 
Djibouti has co-operated with China, whose interests align with Djibouti’s. Country 
provides services both as a transit port and also as an export and import port. In addition, 
in order to gain revenue Djibouti hosts military bases of the United States, China, Italy, 
France and Japan. While French base also hosts groups from Germany and Spain (Dahir, 
2017). According to media reports, also Saudi Arabia has started negotiations with 
Djibouti to open a new military base in Djibouti (Aglionby 2017). Collected rental 
payments of foreign military bases are important to country’s economy and make 
substantial part of Djibouti’s yearly 2-billion-dollar budget. Although exact numbers are 
not revealed for general public, reportedly the United States pays annually 70 million 
dollars, while China pays 20 million dollars as rental payments. 
 
In the spring of 2019, China and Djibouti celebrated 40 years of formal diplomatic 
relations. Albeit countries having diplomatic relations since the 1980´s, their 
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significance did not come into play until 2010s when China and Djibouti started closer 
economic co-operation. Since then, Djibouti has concluded a number of multibillion 
infrastructure projects. In 2017, Djibouti concluded two large infrastructure projects: the 
Doraleh multipurpose port, and Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway line, which were 
financed and constructed with a help of China. Both projects were part of China’s One 
Belt One Road initiative and are significant for Djibouti’s development and economy. 
Albeit the importance and urgent need of the projects, Djibouti has accumulated 
substantial debt due to these projects, which according to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) will increase Djibouti’s public debt to 104% of its GDP by the end of 2018 
(IMF, 2018). There is also growing concerns over Djibouti’s economy as the debt is 
77 % owned by China or Chinese state-owned enterprises (Eom, Brautigam & 
Benabdallah 2018, 4). If Djibouti is unable to pay, the consequences might put fractions 
between China and Djibouti.   
 
1.3 First overseas military base 
 
In March 2015, China evacuated 522 Chinese and foreign civilians from Yemen due to 
worsening security situation (Hua, 2015). This was the largest evacuation operation 
China has conducted in foreign land and at the time the civilians were rescued through 
Djibouti. The rescue operation was successful and widely reported on Chinese media. 
Incident has enforced Chinese public’s sentiment that Chinese government is 
responsible for protecting their own citizens also outside the country’s borders. Thus, 
despite the successful evacuation, the PLA has faced many practical challenges in the 
region and a more solid operation point was needed. 
 
Already by the end of 2015 China’s Foreign Ministry admitted that the negotiations had 
been opened between China and Djibouti to establish the first Chinese military base in 
Djibouti (Hong 2015). Only a year later in February 2016, the construction of the base 
had been initiated. The military base was officially launched on the 1st of August 2017 
when the opening was celebrated in conjunction with the PLA’s founding day (Xinhua 
2017). Initially, many western media outlets speculated and criticized the decision to 
open military base in Djibouti. Despite the criticism among western media, none of the 
foreign countries have officially protested to China (Bai 2016). Albeit, some media 
reports stated that the United States was “blindsided” when discussing the possible new 
opening of the Chinese military base (Jacobs & Perlez 2017).  
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After the opening, the Chinese military base has not been without controversies. Despite 
the initial statements stating that the PLA will not conduct any military exercises on the 
base and that the base is purely for nonmilitary activities, the PLA has conducted 
multiple military exercises on the site (Su, 2017 & People’s Daily, 2018a). According to 
the PLA, exercises have been conducted to test and prepare troop’s combat readiness. 
Soon after opening of the base the Unites States claimed China was using powerful 
lasers to distract their pilots (Lee Myers, 2018). After the incident, the United States 
claimed two pilots got minor injuries, while China refuted the claims entirely. Another 
incident occurred, when China claimed that Japanese military divers had approached a 
Chinese naval vessel. The incident was never officially confirmed by either side (Lo 
2017).  
1.4 Research questions and the relevance of the research  
 
China’s future role and changing position in the world politics can be seen being 
discussed everywhere. Some are celebrating the long-waited change to Western 
dominated world order (e.g. Mahbubani et all 2009), while some are fearful and worried 
about possible effects on power politics (e.g. Roy 2013 & Pan 2004). Theories, of what 
will happen once China “claims its rightful position” or will it ever happen, are debated 
vigorously (e.g. Zhang 2011 & Shambaugh 2017).  
 
During the 4 years that I spend living in China and reading local papers on weekly basis, 
local Chinese media have left me with a strong impression of how China might want it 
to be seen and what sort goals it has for the future. However, in order to further deepen 
this knowledge and the first task was to narrow down and find interesting angle of the 
topic. Amid the initial stages, I found myself asking questions like “how can the change 
be observed?” as well as “how and where can it be observed?”. The questions led to 
discovering China’s African policy and eventually to China’s military base in Djibouti. 
With China’s non-interference policy in mind, the Djibouti base is an interesting case 
considering how it tests the limits of China’s foreign policy principles, and at the same 
time it illustrates how China navigates through the inevitable conflicting response 
especially from Western countries. The non-interference policy will be explained in 
more detail in the chapter 3. Despite the vast intrigue over China´s changing foreign 
policy, the newly opened military base is still largely unresearched which gave an 
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excellent opportunity to find a unique angle for this study and further add to the wider 
discussion of China´s changing position in the world. 
 
I argue that the establishment of China’s first military base in Djibouti can be described 
as decisive point in China’s foreign policy development and it will most certainly have 
implications for future. As the base has been operational only for few years, a little is 
known about the exacts of the base. However, its significance to China’s foreign policy 
is unparalleled as the military base is now active part of China’s foreign policy and a 
part of Belt and Road Initiative. With this research I want to answer to three research 
questions to better understand how China’s military base has become an integral part of 
China’s foreign policy and how it portrays changes in China’s foreign policy. 
 
Firstly, I want to answer the question of how China reasons the opening of the military 
base. While keeping in mind China’s current non-interference policy, reasoning behind 
the establishment is vital to understanding of China’s move to open the base. Reasoning 
is to be expected to support China’s key policy, but the mere existence of the base 
implies a change in foreign policy. Or, by opening the military base, China could be 
choosing an entirely different direction by distancing itself from the non-interference 
policy. The reasons China gives for its first overseas military base play a key role in 
elaborating how China wants world to see itself and what kind of message it wants to 
convey. Breaking down the Chinese official statements into themes will reveal the 
different stories China wants to convey to readers. Secondly, after breaking down and 
discovering the reasons, I want to answer how does China’s reasoning portray change in 
its foreign policy. When a decade ago it would have been inconceivable for China to 
open a military base, now it is more probable to see many new military bases to open in 
the near future. As the actual military base works as a test site for PLA for future bases, 
so it is also an experimental site for Chinese foreign policy makers to see how the world 
reacts to the opening before China starts to further open new bases around the region. 
Lastly, it is explored if the military base has any implications for future. 
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2. Research design, methodology and data 
 
Choosing your source for primary data is crucial part of the research. If resources are 
chosen hastily, the results might not bring the wished answers. After choosing the 
resource, it is similarly vital to choose a fitting method to collect the data. In this 
chapter, the primary sources are introduced. Also, the chosen methodology and research 
design are being explained to illustrate why certain sources were chosen. Lastly, it will 
be discovered how content analysis was utilized during the process of this study to 
analyze the data.  
2.1. Introducing primary sources 
 
When choosing the topic for this thesis, it was intended from the beginning to utilize the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affair´s official statements as a primary source. The 
Ministry´s spokespeople hold press conferences almost daily, during which media 
representatives can ask questions concerning China´s foreign policies, current domestic 
affairs and opinions of China of international affairs. After these press conferences, the 
Ministry releases transcribes the press statements on their official website for further 
distribution. The releases are published not only in Chinese and English, but also in 
Russian, Spanish and Arabic. As the transcriptions are stored on the Ministry´s official 
website, they can be freely accessed by the public without any special permission.   
 
At the moment there are three senior officials who are giving the statements (MFA n.d). 
According to their CV´s, all of the spokespersons’ have distinguished and long careers 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA 2012, MFA 2016b & MFA 2020). As the voice 
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they have important role in bringing forth the voice of 
China to the world. As the spokesperson voice out the direct opinions of the Chinese 
leadership, the statements value should be recognized. Often, compared to the 
statements made by China´s highest leadership, Ministry press releases provide much 
more candid picture of China´s views on current affairs. At times, the voiced views of 
the personnel are rather direct and even controversial. Such case happened in March 
2020, when newly appointed new Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian tweeted statement 
speculating that Covid-19 was brought to Wuhan by United States military (BBC 2020). 
Zhao´s statement provoked Twitter to post notification under his statement to inform the 
public about possible fake news.     
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For supplementing the Ministry’s statements, two media sources were chosen. The 
People´s Daily (人民日报 , Renmin Ribao) is China´s largest media outlet, which 
publishes its content in seven minority languages as well as in nine foreign languages 
(People´s Daily Online, n.d). On their official website, the People´s Daily introduces 
itself as being “among the most influential and authoritative newspapers in China” 
(Liang, 2018). Like many newspapers in China, the People´s Daily is owned by the 
Communist Party of China (CCP) and due to the close ties with the CCP it is considered 
to be the direct mouthpiece of the party (Lee, 2015). People´s Daily and Xinhua are 
considered to be the “twin pillars” of the Party media which are guided by CCP and 
carry similar tone of events when concerned with CCP (Xin 2006, 51). 
 
The Global Times on the other hand, is a much smaller newspaper in terms of 
circulation, but it is one of China´s largest English language newspapers. On their 
website, the Global Times promises not to stray away from sensitive issues and 
describes itself as “a major English newspaper in the nation” (Global Times, n.d). 
Rawnsley (2015) describes the Global Times as one of the three major English language 
newspapers, which writes about China from a Chinese perspective. Western media often 
considers the Global Times as a nationalist newspaper with raunchy views on world 
politics (South China Morning Post n.d). According to South China Morning Post 
article while Global Times is strictly connected to People´s Daily and CCP but as a 
subsidiary paper it can publish more freely about controversial topics (ibid). Global 
Times also covers many military related topics with a special attention to military 
weaponry advancements. 
 
In the end, both of the news sources are directly under CCP and in many ways present 
China´s official line of policy. In combination with the official statements from Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs these resources complement each other and provide meaningful 
source for this study.  
2.2. Case Study Approach 
 
When taking on such a challenging and multidimensional topic as China´s foreign 
policy, one might wonder how it is possible to narrow it down and discover insights into 
the topic. In order to find a more refined focus for this topic a case study approach was 
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chosen as the research design. Case study is a suitable method of research for this topic 
due to its open angle, yet at the same time structured approach to conducting research. 
Case study as a research design supports the whole research project immensely. 
 
Yin defines a case study as being an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clear (Yin 2009, 18). Almost all scientific 
fields use case studies in some way, and thus it is hard to clearly define due to its 
different uses. According to Erikson & Koistinen (2005, 4) maybe the only common 
ground to all these fields are `case or cases´ themselves, which are aimed to be defined, 
analyzed and answered. Erikson & Koistinen (2005, 7) argue that the definition of case 
study can be conducted as long as the case can be clearly separated from the rest of the 
context (historical background, industry, political environment and so worth) it will be 
plausible as a case. Erikson & Koistinen (2005) use a family owned Finnish bakery as 
an example. In their study when conducting a research about a certain company or 
organization is not suitable to include the entire company as a focus but rather than it 
should just focus on one unit or aspect of it (Erikson & Koistinen 2005, 7 - 8). This way 
it will much give a much deeper insight into particular topic. To summarize, a case can 
be something concreate or more of an abstract phenomenon, but what truly establishes 
the case study is how it is defined.   
 
In this study, a sufficient amount of time was applied when defining the case, while also 
paying close attention when searching for an angle on how to approach the topic. 
Conclusively, the definition surfaced naturally due the topic´s nature and sensitivity, 
which has limitations to how much information can be acquired through public sources. 
In this study, the case is defined as China´s military base in Djibouti. As a case, it can 
be clearly defined and due to the limitations of information there is no difficulty in 
limiting the information acquired.  
 
Besides the critical definition of `case´, also the research questions need to be 
considered when opting for a case study. In a case study, research questions often start 
with either “how” or “why” (Yin 2009, 4). In this study, the aim is to discover how does 
China reason the opening of its first overseas military base and how does this portray 
the changes in China´s foreign policy. Thus, the study fills the requirements of case 
study research. Nevertheless, to further clarify, this research should not be confused 
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with any military studies, where one would estimate the operational capacity, or such 
based on the specifics of the base. Such specifics as manpower, armament or similar 
subjects are not the focus of this research. These kinds of “details” do offer certain 
insights to understanding the military base in its entirety, but they do not concern this 
thesis.  
 
One common misconception regarding the case study is to confuse it with being merely 
a data collection method, when it is in fact a research strategy that guides the research 
from the beginning to end. The principle idea behind case study research is to gather as 
much information as possible to comprehensively understand the topic of research, but 
the method of doing so varies between different research projects. It is also common to 
combine various methods within a single research project. This could mean, for 
example, collecting survey answers and later supplementing them with interviews. Both 
qualitative and quantitative methods are being used in case study research even though 
in the social sciences, qualitative methods are more commonly used. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that the use of only one type of primary data source prevents a research 
project from being defined as a case study. 
2.3. Collecting primary data   
 
In order to find relevant articles, a simple search toolbar command was used for each 
statement release and website. Essentially, this would bring out all the articles related to 
the keyword being used, whether the word would be in the title or within the article 
itself. Before starting the actual data collection, several “test searches” were conducted 
to see the possible results. After the test phase was completed, a conscious decision was 
made to limit the keyword to “Djibouti”. Djibouti as a keyword choice proved to bring 
the largest amount of relevant texts. While it might seem simple, optimizing the results 
was vital for the success of collecting all the relevant data. Unsurprisingly, this also 
meant that during the data collection period, large quantities of irrelevant articles would 
appear in the searches from topics, such as economy, culture, etc. Nevertheless, Djibouti 
is a rather small country which is normally not covered extensively in the media, thus 
the amount of “not relevant” texts were still be manageable, and it did not extensively 
complicate the search for primary sources. 
 
As mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the research the intention was to use solely the 
official ministry spokespeople´s statements, however while going through the releases, 
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it appeared that the amount of statements would be insufficient. Also, the access to 
Ministry of National Defense´s similar press statements was not possible. The decision 
to add the People´s Daily and the Global Times as new sources of primary data was a 
natural step for this research and proved to be fruitful. The goal of the data collection 
was to find all the possible articles related to the topic from these three different sources. 
In the end, ten statements from the Ministry press releases, 27 news articles from the 
People´s Daily and 25 articles from the Global Times were gathered altogether. These 
add up to roughly 40 pages of text for analysis. Resources were collected from over 
three-year period starting from the early 2015 until end of October 2018.  
2.4. Qualitative content analysis  
 
After retrieving all the necessary material for the study, the next natural step was to start 
the analysis. For analyzing the data, qualitative content analysis was chosen as a 
suitable method for analysis. According to Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2002, 117), content 
analysis is a method that enables a researcher to analyze documents systematically and 
objectively. The aim of this method is to get a compressed and generalized description 
of the research phenomenon (Tuomi & Arajärvi 2002, 117). 
 
Generally, content analysis research has been divided into two categories: theory-driven 
content analysis, which relies on pre-determined theories, models or concepts to analyze 
the data, and data-driven content analysis which aims to create its own theoretical units. 
Previous observations, theories and information should not have any influence on the 
results of analysis, because the analysis is presumed to be data driven. In this thesis, the 
data-driven approach is applied in order to acquire unique results. Data-driven analysis 
does not come without its own downsides, as it is hard to distinguish what observations 
are purely “objective” as a person´s background and thoughts on the topic indisputably 
guide the researcher. The problem can be minimized by acknowledging the theories that 
help the analysis but are not bound by them. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 108-110.) 
 
Researcher Timo Laine (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002, 104) suggests that qualitative content 
analysis proceeds in four simple stages, which are: gathering the data, going through 
data and marking the essential parts, categorizing it, and the summary. This is merely a 
simplification of the whole process, but it illustrates how content analysis is normally 
executed. The analysis part of this thesis has followed Laine´s suggested “path” of 
qualitative content analysis.  
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According to Tuomi and Arajärvi (2002, 105), during the second stage the data is 
carefully processed under a strict microscope and all the interesting parts, with 
relevance to the research question, are marked. During this stage, I simply printed out 
all the data and underlined all the significant parts with different colors. This enabled 
me to better determine if the data answered my research question as well as enabled me 
to more closely familiarize myself with the data. Tuomi and Arajärvi (2002, 104) also 
state that the second stage is imperative as all the unnecessary data will be cut out and 
only relevant parts of the research are left for further analysis. 
 
At the time of the third phase, I used different colors to signify different themes. 
According to Tuomi and Arajärvi (2002, 107), thematizing means finding views that 
correlate with imagined themes. At first, the colored underlining was used to create 
multiple subcategories. Later on, these subcategories were placed and grouped under 
larger themes. Great amount of time was spent on thematizing as this can be seen as the 
pillar of the analysis and thus highly important. This included going back to the data 
multiple times, shifting different components of material and changing names of the 
themes multiple times to better correspond the set goals of this study. Constant 
reviewing and shifting of components assured that the best possible outcome was 
achieved. Due to the constant reviewing and analyzing some components that were 
deemed important in the beginning of the analysis process was cut out later due to a 
newfound better understanding of the topic. In the last part of the analysis process 
conclusions were drawn from the processed and encoded data. Analyzing and 
organizing data to comprehendible text with relevant references was challenging but the 
results can be described satisfactory.   
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3. China´s Africa policy 
 
In the following chapter, the most relevant parts of China´s Africa policy for this study 
are being introduced. China´s Africa policy is a comprehensive policy that extends to 
variety of different areas of co-operation extending from security matters to agriculture, 
education and media. The most notable aspect of China´s policy has been its somewhat 
unorthodox and aggressive trade policy and specifically noticeable has been the 
investments on Africa´s infrastructure and energy sectors under the umbrella of the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI). While economic ties between China and Africa are 
indisputably the core basis of China-Africa relations, it would be unwise to 
underestimate the importance of other aspects like soft power, security and political 
influence.  
 
To clarify the country´s intentions in Africa, China has published two white papers on 
its Africa policy. The first one was published in 2006 (MFA 2006). The second, more 
recent one, was published in 2015 (China Daily 2015). Both of the papers highlight the 
key areas of co-operation where China wants to deepen Sino-Africa relations. While the 
first paper is more generalized in terms of goals, it does elaborate all the fields where 
China aspires for deeper co-operation. The fields of co-operation are political, economic, 
education, science, culture, health & social and peace & security (MFA 2006). Co-
operation is wanted on all levels of interaction from high-level visits to people-to-
people exchanges. The second paper demonstrates in much more details the areas of co-
operation. Apart from the evident ones, some surprising co-operation areas are for 
example media and education (China Daily 2015). Releasing not only one but two white 
papers on Africa policy, China demonstrates the strategic importance it attaches to the 
relations with the continent.  
 
While China has gained momentum in Africa and has expanded to all corners and levels 
of the continent, academia has raised their concerns about China´s actions (e.g. 
Kinyondo 2019 & Van Dijk 2009). As a result, there are plenty of researches with 
varying opinions on China´s Africa policy and its implications on the continent. In this 
regard, it is possible to detect three different “camps” with distinctive views on what is 
China´s African policy and how effective it has been. The first one is the obvious pro-
China camp, which mainly touts the positive aspects of co-operation while disregarding 
some quite obvious negative outcomes of co-operation (e.g. Addis 2018 & Zhu and 
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Mahubani 2011). China supporters steadfastly claim that China is going to, or already, 
has brought rapid development to Africa. The second camp is the anti-China camp that 
sees China´s actions in Africa as purely neocolonialistic (e.g. Quinn 2011 & Jauch 
2011). According to the anti-China camp, with its neocolonialistic intentions China tries 
to control Africa through exploitative trade deals and thus is endangering African states´ 
sovereignty. To put simply China´s intentions are to take over Africa through economic 
means. The third group is the more moderate camp that stands somewhere between pro-
China and neocolonialism that critically examines the positive and negative aspects of 
China´s actions in Africa (Shinn & Eisenman 2012, Alden 2005 & Van Dijk 2009). In 
this study, I aspire to follow the lead of the third camp by maintaining a critical and 
objective outlook on all aspects of China´s Africa policy.   
 
China´s reasons for forging strong relations with Africa are numerous. Western 
academics tend to name four main missions where the last one is differing from 
academic to academic (e.g. Alden 2005, Shinn 2013 and Hauer & Morris 2014). Alden 
describes the four missions as follows: resource security, new markets and investment 
opportunities, forging strategic partnerships and symbolic diplomatic and development 
assistance (Alden 2005, 148-152). Clearly, the economic aspects of Sino-African 
relations are taking more central role. While this chapter does not literally follow the 
missions stated by Alden and others, they guide through the most relevant topics. This 
chapter will be broken down into three different paragraphs which introduce the main 
spheres of the policy. The first paragraph will discuss the main concepts of the foreign 
policy from the overall point of view and introduce the non-interference policy. The 
second paragraph presents the China-Africa economic co-operation and the infamous 
soft loans. In the last paragraph China´s security policy in Africa will be familiarized.  
3.1. The basis of Chinese foreign policy  
 
Since the 1990s the emphasis that Chinese leaders have been putting on China-Africa 
relations has been demonstrated symbolically every year, when China´s Foreign 
Minister´s first official trip of the year is always destined to the African continent 
(Desheng 2019). The importance is also shown by the overall number of China´s top 
leaders´ visits to African countries which is, much higher than the figure of Western 
leaders. Furthermore, the visits are not only concentrated on larger countries but expand 
to variety of countries (Lijadu 2019). The annual symbolic first visit has not gone 
unnoticed among African leaders and has garnered much appreciation. For China these 
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trips have proven to be an inexpensive and effective way to build state-to-state relations 
with African nations. (Shinn 2013, 88.) Additionally, China has been demonstrating 
country´s friendship and solidarity by gifting local governments with buildings such as 
football stadiums, schools, hospitals and even government buildings (Alden 2006, 150). 
In the case of Djibouti and Uganda , China even financed and build new foreign 
ministry buildings for both of the countries. 
 
The above cases of expression of friendship are not without a cause as China aims to 
garner strategic and symbolic diplomatic support from African nations. China has 
realized that in order to bring forth country´s interests in international arenas China 
needs political partners (Shinn 2013, 85). International political support is needed to 
increase leeway in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the 
International Monetary Fund. In many forums, African nations count almost one-third 
of all votes (van Dijik 2009, 202) and thus it constitutes as powerful voting bloc. That 
being said, as mentioned earlier China has several reasons to be in Africa. The next few 
paragraphs introduce the most relevant parts of China´s foreign policy measures in 
Africa.   
3.1.1. The three discourses of friendship  
In order to validate and forge strong Sino-African relations, China has adopted different 
discourses to separate itself from Western powers as well to gain trust of African 
nations. It is necessary for China to appear as a reliable and friendly partner who can be 
trusted. The trust between the countries is building on selectively highlighting certain 
historical events sometimes with slim evidence (Strauss 2009, 780-781). The three 
discourses are “ancient friendship”, “common past under colonial subjugation” and 
“Tazara narrative”. China actively uses these discourses to strengthen and create links 
between China and Africa (see Wang & Meng 2018 & Wu 2020). 
 
Firstly, China builds its first discourse on the Sino-African relations on common 
friendship of over 600 years. According to China, this friendship stems from encounters 
between China and Africa that appeared during the 1400s when admiral Zheng He (郑
和) was sent to Eastern Africa by the Yongle emperor to explore the Pacific Ocean, 
Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Africa. In this narrative, China portrays the relation 
between China and Africa as always been on equal terms and peaceful, whereas China 
depicts Western countries as colonialist with a long history of abuse of Africa. While 
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this discourse is not actively used in foreign policy it builds the character of friendly 
nations that share a long history together. (Sverdrup-Thygeson 2017, 62-63.) De facto, 
historically speaking admiral Zheng made a number of trips to the Eastern Africa to 
explore with a large fleet of warships and military troops. China´s claims of friendship 
and equality have been rebuked various times (e.g. Shinn & Eisenmann 2012 & Wade 
2005). Despite the evidence, China still insists on Zhang He´s diplomatic intentions in 
the region. Xinhua News Agency wrote about Zhang He´s trip the following which 
depicts the discourse accurately:  
 
 “Along with Zheng's legendary voyages, this is evidence that China chose to be 
 a bringer of peace when it had the potential to be a bully. Unlike later Western 
 explorers driven by greed for gold, diamonds and fragrances, the mammoth fleet 
 of the world's strongest navy at the time brought to foreign countries presents 
 and advanced technology, and even helped mediate conflicts between 
 indigenous clans”. (Xinhua 2005.) 
The second discourse China uses is the “colony narrative”, which stresses the common 
shared history of colonialism. China´s message is that Western nations, which 
colonialized and enslaved African people, are unrelatable, nasty and brutish. This 
narrative emphasizes how China understands the suffering and problems that African 
countries have gone through and shares a similar past. Colony narrative is used to 
differentiate China and Africa from Western powers and their brutal history in the 
continent. This is important for China in order to underscore the fact that China would 
not do the same as the West has done in the past. As Sverdrup-Thygeson (2017, 63) 
argues, the “colony narrative image of identity singles China out with historical moral 
superiority”. In a way, China is communicating that the country is different and more 
suitable for cooperation than the West. As described earlier, in this scenario the West is 
depicted as “the other” that does not belong in the continent. (Sverdrup-Thygeson 2017, 
63.) 
The last discourse is the TAZARA narrative which is constructed on the basis of 
support that China gave to decolonizing African nations in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Sverdrup-Thygeson 2017, 65). The TAZARA (or TaZam) refers to the largescale 
Tanzania-Zambia railway project that was sponsored and built by China during 1969-
1976 as a sign of solidarity towards African nations (Strauss 2009, 786). Nevertheless, 
before the TAZARA project began China took part in the Asia-Africa Conference in 
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1955 in Bandung which became the bedrock of Sino-Africa relations. During the 
Conference China aligned itself with the rest of the world´s developing countries 
(Strauss 2009, 782). The “Bandung Spirit” and China´s Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence share similar ideals of peaceful and supportive co-existence. China´s 
principles of peaceful co-existence will be later introduced in the next chapter.  
Following the Bandung Conference, China started to offer economic, technical and 
military support for struggling nations seeking independence from colonial rule in 
Africa. Evidently, this meant not respecting the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence. At the same time, the struggles between China and the Soviet Union 
escalated and resulted in hostile relations between the two. This led up to China seeking 
diplomatic support from African nations. Close ties with Africa, led by Egypt to be the 
first African country to recognize the PRC, while ROC still retained the official seat of 
the UN Security Council. (Shinn & Eisenman 2012, 34-36.) 
This era´s most notable form of support was the TAZARA. First, the project was 
officially offered to Western countries, but publicly rejected, then later it was picked up 
by China (Strauss 2009, 787). TAZARA was eventually accomplished with economical 
and technical support from China. The project demanded 50 000 Chinese workers and 
engineers’ efforts which resulted in an 1860-kilometer long railway between Tanzania 
and Zambia. The support China gave at the time symbolizes country´s benevolence 
even during a time when China itself was poor as well. To China this act of sincerity 
shows that the Chinese will not turn their back on African nations in the future either. 
This era has become the major discourse China is using in its policies towards Africa. 
(Sverdrup-Thygeson 2017, 65.) Despite the importance attached to the TAZARA 
project in modern era discourse, in fact at the time of construction the railway had very 
little exposure in Chinese media (Strauss 2009, 787).    
To conclude, these discourses are used to naturalize China´s presence and white-wash 
China´s intentions in Africa. While Zheng He, the Tazara and anticolonial narrative 
might not be used in daily reporting on Sino-African relations, the narratives are 
reoccurring and central for China´s rhetoric (Sverdrup-Thygeson 2017, 68). To China, 
this discourse is carefully crafted and solidifies the long-lasting friendship of Sino-
African relations and negates claims of China´s neocolonialist intentions. While in this 
study these narratives stay in the background, the same motives and narratives can be 
seen in the data as well.  
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3.1.2. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the non-interference 
policy 
 
The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were first established during the 
negotiations between China, India and Myanmar in the 1950s during border altercations 
(MFA 2014). From then on, these principles have been the core of China´s foreign 
policy. The five principles are as follows: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (MFA 2014). Later these have 
been dubbed to be called as the non-interference policy. China´s Consulate General in 
Karachi comments how the principles are closely intertwined with foreign policy:   
  
 “China's development is peaceful in nature, and it will not harm or threaten 
 anyone. China will never seek to advance its interests at the expense of others. 
 China does not seek hegemony now, nor will it do so in the future. -- China has 
 been interacting with its neighbors for thousands of years. And all along, we 
 have valued harmonious relations and treated others with sincerity. When others 
 respect us, we respect them even more. Going forward, we will more actively 
 practice the guideline of "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness". 
 We will help our neighboring countries and peoples benefit more from China's 
 reform and opening up. We will help them better appreciate China's 
 commitment to peaceful development. We are willing to listen to voices from 
 our neighboring countries and respond to their doubts about China's 
 neighbourhood policy”. (MFA 2014.) 
To summarize, from China´s perspective the policy is essentially based on mutual 
respect towards every country´s culture, sovereignty and internal affairs. Thus, China 
presses only one pre-condition for its counterparts and that is an acknowledgement of 
One-China policy which denounces the existence of sovereign Taiwan (Embassy of 
China in Norway 2004). China constitutes Taiwan issue as country´s internal affair and 
thus do not tolerate other countries involvement in the matter (Embassy of China in 
Norway 2004). Traditionally, Africa has been a diplomatic support ground for Taiwan 
although at the moment all African nations, apart from Eswatini (former Swaziland), 
have recognized the One-China policy (Solomon 2018). In practice, non-interference 
policy refers to China´s policy of accepting any country despite its political regime or 
stability. Topics such as corruption, human right violations, poor governance and the 
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legitimacy of government do not matter to China as these issues constitute as internal 
matters from which China stays away. 
That being said, the policy has shown misgivings and China applies the non-
interference policy far more flexibly than it might present in its official foreign policy 
discourse. In the case of Africa, it has eventually led China to work with countries with 
myriad of issues. For example, many African nations that China is in close relations 
with are either in a fragile state or they have had long-lasting wars. Such countries are, 
for example, Uganda, Congo, Sudan and South Sudan. In these countries and their 
subjacent situations China´s business and trade interests have collided. Since the non-
interference policy has not suited well the extreme conditions in some of these unstable 
countries, China has been compelled to revise and adopt its policies (e.g. Natsios 2012, 
Large 2009 & Duchatel et al. 2014). Thus, even China has chosen to interfere in some 
of these countries matters.  
A good example, of China’s increased involvement, is Sudan. Since the 1990s China 
has been heavily involved in Sudan´s oil industry. In fact, it was with the help of 
Chinese companies and diplomatic efforts that Sudan could establish and widen its oil 
business and China´s support has become vital for Sudan and South-Sudan. The 
situation has led to reliance between Sudan and China as China is the main buyer of oil 
as well as the largest source of investment in the country (Natsios 2012, 62). Between 
2000-2017 China imported 68 % of all Sudan´s crude oil (OEC). Sudan has experienced 
continuous instability throughout its history until today. In 2003, instabilities rose again 
and there were massive protests against the central government in Dafur which is in the 
western part of country. Khartoum government resolved to violently suppressing the 
rebellions which left 300 000 people dead and the instabilities are still ongoing. Despite 
the conflict, China continued to give its political support for the Khartoum government 
(Lee et al. 2012, 429). In fact, around the time of 2003 China had paid some of the 
purchased oil with arms that were later used for suppressing the rebellions (Natsios 
2012, 63).  
The international community, especially non-governmental organizations, as well as 
human rights groups, were outraged and demanded China to withdraw its support for 
Sudan and pressure the country to let UN peacekeeping forces to enter the country 
which China opposed. During many years of conflict China remained unmoved 
(Benadallah 2016, 26). The rage of Western groups did not diminish, and the groups 
started to demand boycotting of Beijing 2008 Olympics and the crisis started to have 
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larger negative impact on China´s international reputation. Under the pressure, China 
did eventually persuade Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to let UN troops to enter the 
country which ran against particularly with president Bashir´s wishes and later this 
culminated into Chinese senior leadership expressing guarded criticism over Khartoum 
government´s actions (Large 2009, 619). The most visible comments were made by 
former Chinese President Hu Jintao when he suggested four principles of how to resolve 
Dafur crisis (Large 2009, 619.)  
However, the struggles did not end there and instabilities eventually led to civil war and 
the consequent division of Sudan. The civil war resulted in the division of China´s oil 
interests, with around 75 % of oil production being in South Sudan and this led China to 
shift its diplomatic efforts to the South. By doing this, China ended up “protecting their 
tenuous position in the South but at the same time alienated and angered the North” 
(Natsios 2012, 66). North and South´s disputes continued and shifted towards oil and 
the oil pipeline that goes through the North. Eventually, North started to demand hefty 
36$ per barrel transfer fee instead of the standard 1$ per barrel (Natsios 2012, 66) which 
led South Sudan to shut down the oil production entirely for an extended period of time. 
This then resulted in economic losses to Chinese oil companies and dissatisfaction for 
China. To conclude, the continuous instabilities and threat of war, international pressure, 
fear of losing the access to oil has prompted China to take more active approach to 
China´s Sudan policy while increasing China´s participation in both Sudan’s internal 
matters (Natsios 2012, 64).  
According to Alden & Large (2015, 124), despite China´s high visibility and 
significance in many of these post-war countries, it lacks coherent post-conflict and 
fragile state approaches. Such approaches are needed if China wants to keep doing 
business in unstable countries in Africa. But unlike many believe, African nations’ 
instability extends much further than China´s economic concerns, which is why China, 
as a permanent member of the UN´s Security Council, must weigh in to make sensible 
decisions (Alden & Large 2015, 124). In the case of Sudan, China repeatedly protected 
Sudan´s regime in the UN Security Council by voting against resolutions against the 
Sudanese government and vetoing resolutions also by hampering the UN Security 
Council´s decision-making process (Manyok 2016, 4). To conclude, it can be stated that 
not only did China use its diplomatic relations to influence Sudanese decision making 
within the country, China did also use its position within the UN Security Council for 
its own benefits. With the addition of China´s peacekeeping work Alden & Large claim 
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that in some sense China is in the process of becoming a norm maker in Africa (Alden 
& Large 2015, 125). This then points to the direction of China being flexible with the 
interpretation of non-interference policy. 
Although, China is projecting slight chances in its approach to non-interference policy, 
it is still unlikely that China would abandon the policy anytime soon. The reason being 
that China does not have a post-conflict policy in itself as China has entirely different 
look on development and peace altogether compared to the conventional Western model 
(Alden & Large 2015, 139). This being said, China ties peace and development closely 
together (Benadallah 2016, 19). The Chinese concept of peace is built on four different 
aspects that differentiate itself from Western and African concept of peace building.  
First and the most prominent aspect is the notion that universal human rights, elections, 
democracy and market economy are not necessary for building peace. This is the most 
distinctive difference between Western and Chinese thinking. Secondly, unlike Western 
policy makers, the Chinese exclusively believe that peace is built through economic 
development. The development is achieved through vast investments in infrastructure, 
e.g. railways, airports, ports, highways and power stations. Thirdly, the standing of 
regional organizations should be enhanced in global security management. This means 
that regional offices, such as the African Union, should have a larger say when 
engagement with their member states is considered and their opinions should be 
respected. Lastly, the African states themselves are crucial in peacebuilding and 
emphasis should be given to their human resource development training, which is 
critical for fragile states´ development. (Alden & Large 2015, 135-136).  
From China´s point of view, their policy of peace building through development comes 
directly from the experience and success of China´s own rapid development 
(Benadellah 2016, 16) and which it wished to be translated to success in Africa. 
Although cases like Sudan demonstrate that in complicated situations economic 
development might not be enough to bring peace and stability. Nevertheless, China 
offers an alternative model to Western one that is appealing especially for African 
leaders and countries that have a hard time gaining support from traditional institutions 
(van Dijk 2009, 203). 
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3.2. Trade policy 
 
China´s economic influence in Africa is strong and broad extending to all corners of 
Africa. Economic wise China needs Africa and Africa needs China. In order to sustain 
Chinese factories working, it needs to purchase seemingly limitless amounts of raw 
materials like copper, coal, cobalt and oil from Africa. In return, China imports finished 
affordable consumer goods for demands of the African markets (Shinn & Eisenman 
2012, 99) and gives out the soft loans for massive infrastructure projects. China is no a 
small player in the continent as demonstrated by the share amount of trade that is 
passing between China and Africa. At the moment China is Africa´s largest trading 
partner having surpassed the Unites States in 2009 (Luo 2018). Sino-African trade has 
been growing steadily over the years and in 2018, China-Africa trade was worth 
staggering $185 billion dollars (CARI 2020). According to the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) trade between Africa and China increased on year to year basis 
staggering 19,7 % in 2018 (MOFCOM 2019).  
 
Despite impressive numbers and ostensibly forever growing trade, China has a $20 
billion trade surplus to Africa (CARI 2020). A closer look also reveals that China 
exports a variety of different types of goods to Africa ranging from consumer goods, 
capital goods, intermediary goods to textiles and clothing which is all natural. 
Meanwhile imports from Africa to China include mainly raw materials, fuels and 
minerals. (WITS Database.) The imbalance does not support Africa´s development as 
the countries would unwillingly focus on producing products that there is demand for. 
While Africa as a whole is prone to have trade deficit to China on yearly basis, on the 
country level the numbers are different. In these cases, countries with rich raw materials 
(like Angola, South Sudan and Zambia) tend to have large surplus unlike countries with 
little mineral resources (like Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia) which have to endure large 
trade deficits (Shinn & Eisenman 2012, 115-116). Then, the countries with large deficits 
to China are flooded with large quantities of low-quality textiles, clothes and footwear 
(Shinn 2013, 90). 
3.2.1. Soft loans  
The most well-known and debated form of Sino-African economic co-operation are the 
infamous multi-billion soft loans that are intended for large infrastructure projects. 
These soft loans have been highly criticized by the West, especially Western media, but 
33/84 
– at the same time – they are highly valued by African leaders (Alden 2006, 91). The 
loans are the backbone of China´s economic policy in Africa and, therefore, the topic 
needs a closer look to be fully understood.  
 
To begin with, Chinese loans are difficult to track as China does not release official data 
about them. China Africa Research Initiate at John Hopkins University (CARI) has the 
most comprehensive data base of Chinese loans, although they admit that as there is 
much secrecy surrounding the loans the exact numbers and conditions remain a mystery. 
In return, the recipient countries do not necessarily want to disclose all the details either. 
Between 2000-2017 CARI estimates that Chinese government, banks and SOEs have 
granted loans worth 146 billion dollars to African nations. While the loans seem 
staggering, there are vast differences between individual countries on how much loan 
has been taken. Nevertheless, it is vital to be reminded that by no means is China the 
largest creditor in Africa. (CARI.) Jubilee Debt Campaign estimates that 20 % of the 
debt in Africa originates from China or Chinese companies or banks (Jubilee Debt 
Campaign 2018). As in any country in the world, the loans are divided between 
different creditors ranging from multilateral institutions to other bilateral creditors 
besides China. However, some countries have taken more debt from China compared to 
others. The top receiver of Chinese loans in Africa is Angola, which has received 42,8 
billion dollars over 17 years’ time period (CARI).  
 
While every soft loan agreement is negotiated in its own terms, they still tend to have 
often similar characteristics and the following section will introduce some of these 
characteristics. The most recognizable aspect of China´s soft loans is the basis of 
seemingly “no strings attached” with only condition being the acceptance of One-China 
policy. Although it is likely that if African leaders would comment on China´s treatment 
of Tibetans or Uyghurs or anything along those lines, the cash flow might stop (Shinn 
2013, 92). Essentially, there are no other political preconditions attached to them, unlike 
with multinational institution loans granted by OECD, IMF World Bank and such. 
Multinational loans have often preconditions attached to them like improvement of 
human rights situation, democracy or fair governance practices and demand substantial 
negotiations to be approved (Behuria 2018, 171). In the contrary, Chinese soft loans can 
be negotiated in few months with flexible back-payment timetables. Thus, it is no 
wonder that China´s soft loans are attractive to governments whose policies have 
resulted in impoverishment, fueled internal conflicts or have systematically violated 
34/84 
human rights (Alden 2006, 154). Naturally, these types of governments would have 
difficulties to obtain loans from multinational loan givers due to inability to meet the 
requirements of foreign loan givers. As China treats these kinds of issues as countries´ 
internal matter, any sovereign government is applicable as a loan receiver without 
regard to their current political situation. In the past, China was, for example, supporting 
the Guinean government economically and politically during massacre that left 150 
people dead and missing (Balint-Kurti, 2010, 17). At the time the UN, African Union 
and all the Western nations ceased all co-operation with the country, but China did not. 
Similar circumstances occurred in Sudan during the civil war. However, it would be a 
mistake to think that only corrupt governments would take on Chinese loan offers.  
 
The popularity of Chinese soft loans might not come as surprising if one looks at the 
matter closer. Many African countries lack even the most basic infrastructure meaning 
there is no reliable source of energy nor is there roads. The situation is severe and 
should not be understated. “For instance, only 38 % of the African population has access 
to electricity, the penetration rate for the Internet is less than 10 %, while only a quarter 
of Africa’s road network is paved. Studies have shown that poor road, rail and port 
facilities add 30 % to 40 % to the costs of goods traded among African countries, thus 
adversely affecting the private sector development and the flow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI)” (Mayaki n.d). In addition, African leaders do not want political 
conditionality imposed by Western leaders who often see Western conditions as 
paternalistic (Hanauert & Morris 2014, 57). As African countries see China 
understanding their culture and history better than the previous Western colonizers.  
 
As lucrative these loans may appear, Chinese soft loan deals seem to come with some 
setbacks. Naturally, many of the issues stem from the weak rule of law in the host 
country but also from the contracts themselves. Firstly, as stated earlier the loans are 
often granted for large infrastructure projects. After African country secures the loan for 
the project, Chinese state-owned companies (SOEs) would in most of the cases wind up 
winning the projects and executing them (Shinn 2013, 92). When Chinese companies 
handle these large infrastructure projects, they are often built with Chinese workers 
brought out from mainland. When African laborers are hired, they do the most menial 
tasks with no chance to advance and often get paid less compared to Chinese workers. 
(Hanauer & Morris 2014, 48.) The lack of transparency and competitive bidding makes 
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the projects vulnerable for corruption as well as these types of projects run a risk of 
inflated costs (Morris 2020). 
 
Projects also often use materials that are brought from all the way from China which 
seems an unorthodox way compared to more traditional projects. According to Hubbard 
(2008) Chinese side even encourages Chinese companies to “purchase and import from 
China as much equipment, technology and services as possible” (2008, 225). This line 
of development does not bring much needed new jobs or human development to Africa 
nor does it even support the local economy by using local materials. Many of the 
projects also have been accused of violating labor laws and not following safety 
measures (Jauch 2011, 55). For example, the situation in Zambia escalated so badly that 
local mob ended up killing one Chinese and injuring two after Chinese company was 
accused of not respecting labor laws (Okeowo 2013). Some have also raised concerns 
over the environmental impact of the said projects (van Dijk 2009, 208).  
 
In addition, corruption and bribes are common in connection with Chinese loans and 
businesses (Isakson & Kotsadam 2018, 157). Corruption is typical in the negotiation 
period as after signing the contracts Chinese party keeps tight gaps on the finances of 
the projects by administrating the funds themselves (Hanauer & Morris 2014, 51). Due 
to corruption and lack of transparency involved when taking loans, sometimes even the 
recipient governments are unaware of all the agreed terms which might cause political 
turmoil and add a risk of wasted government funds. Many of the issues seem to be 
similar to the issues China faces itself back home. While the issues are widely reported, 
there are also success stories and their significance is undeniable.  
 
Due to the inequality of the loans and the subsequent consequences in Africa, the loans 
have revoked some scholars and especially Western media to call loans as “debt-trap 
diplomacy” (e.g. Kiyondo 2019, Behuria 2018 & Jauch 2011). Debt trap diplomacy 
refers to China´s lending policy that intentionally lends out massive sums to countries to 
extract geopolitical concessions (Rajah et al. 2019, 4). Besides the above-mentioned 
criticism, there are far more comprehensive issues at hand when it comes to Chinese 
funded loans. Firstly, there are researches that prove that Chinese loans have higher 
interest rates and shorter gracing periods (Buchholz 2019). While compared to 
commercial loans these rates might not be high but compared to traditional lenders, they 
are harsh (Morris 2020). Secondly, many of the loans payback methods are tied to 
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countries´ alternative assets. This can mean giving access to raw minerals, mineral 
deposits, ports access rights and such (Green 2019). Despite Chinese loan shortcomings, 
African leaders are aware of the risks involved with the massive debt they have 
undertaken and are ready to call off agreements and projects, if needed (Benabdallah, 
2019). While varying opinions remain if China is actually performing debt trap 
diplomacy, there are still very few examples of China ceasing the operations of an entire 
facility in Africa. Thus, some recent studies find that while China does not practice 
debt-trap diplomacy per se, it nevertheless needs to review its harmful lending practices 
(e.g. Rajah et al. 2019, Brautigam 2019 & Gong 2020). Sri Lankan Hambantota port is 
said to be the precedent example of China seizing national strategic infrastructure due to 
unpaid debt.  
 
A small West Asian country of Sri Lanka is a prime example of a country that has 
accumulated debt of around 8-9 billion US dollars from Chinese state-owned banks 
(Behuria 2018, 174). Before the beginning of the project, Hambantota was a small 
insignificant fishing village, but – with the help of China – it was suddenly envisioned 
to become a future hotspot for trade in the Indian Pacific. When the project started, it 
was supposed to pay back itself commercially and transform the economy of the 
surrounding area. Despite the promises and grand plans, the Chinese led project has 
been underperforming and as a result, Sri Lanka has had to surrender its strategic 
Hambantota port with a 99-year lease to Chinese companies with 80 % ownership as 
well as 15 000 acres of land around it to be developed as an industrial zone for Chinese 
investors (Behuria 2018, 173). Later, rumors surfaced that Hambantota would be turned 
into a Chinese military base, but Sri Lanka prime minister rebuked the claims shortly 
after they surfaced (Times of India 2018). Recently, Western observers are also worried 
about Djibouti, which has accumulated debt of around $1,2 billion from which 77 % 
originates from either the Chinese government or Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(Blanchard & Collins 2019). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that by 
the end of 2018 Djibouti´s public debt will mound up to 104 % of its GDP (IMF 2018).  
 
While nothing similar has yet to happen in Africa, apart from Djibouti there are already 
multiple African countries that are in a brink of defaulting loans originating from China. 
Statista names Niger and the Republic of Congo whose external debt to China exceeds 
25 % of their GDP (Buchholz 2019.) In spring 2020, senior Zambian officials informed 
that they are considering surrendering country´s third-largest copper mine to China in 
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exchange for debt forgiveness (Parkinson et al. 2020). Around the same time, Angolan 
Minister of State for Economic Coordination, Manuel Nunes Júnior informed that the 
country is renegotiating their terms of Chinese loans to end the use of oil as a guarantee 
for bilateral debt (Macauhub 2020). To be precise, Angola has had also similar terms 
for its loans with Brazil and Israel as well. What needs to be considered is that many 
countries, also Western ones, have external debt and they also face difficulties in 
repaying thus facing payment struggles is nothing unusual per se. That being said, 
observers point out that if not careful, these loans could pose a serious threat to African 
countries economy (e.g. Kiyondo 2018, van Dijik 2009).  
 
Despite all the criticism, the Chinese built infrastructure has undoubtedly contributed to 
African GDP growth (Hanauer & Morris 2014, 49). The Chinese loans offer unseen 
possibilities to African nations as long as they are not too excessive and are managed 
well. The impact China has had on Africa is not as negative as some would suggest but 
certainly not as positive as China claims (Morris 2020). African leaders themselves 
seem unbothered by Western observers’ criticism and even in the situation of debt crisis 
African leaders still prefer to seek help from China. If African leadership would take 
more responsibility and China, in return, would follow more sustainable debt measures, 
the outcomes of Chinese led projects would have far more positive results.  
3.3. Security policy  
 
China´s 2015 white paper on Military Strategy defines new tasks for the PLA. What 
used to be called “offshore defence” which focused on defending Chinese territory and 
helping out with domestic security issues, the PLA has now shifted towards a strategy 
of “active defence”, which involves safeguarding the security of China’s overseas 
interests and maintaining regional and world peace (Legarda 2018). Despite the more 
international outlook 2015 white paper still maintains the basis of the non-interference 
policy by stating that:  
 
 “China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an 
 independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is 
 defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, and 
 will never seek hegemony or expansion. China’s armed forces will remain a 
 staunch force in maintaining world peace.” (State Council 2015.) Formally, in 
 accordance with the non-interference policy the country adheres to military-to-
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 military relations that are “non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed 
 against any third party” (PRC´s State Council 2015).  
 
The only exception from this is the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance between China and North Korea (Boc 2019). When it comes to China´s 
international areas of priorities for security matters Africa is not at the top of China´s 
priority list (Shinn & Eisenman 2012, 164). The South China Sea and East China Sea 
conflicts and relations between China and its neighboring countries are much more 
important for China´s interests. This perspective is clearly shown also through the 
development of China-Africa security ties throughout history. As stated already earlier 
during Mao´s era, China´s support was based on idealistic values, and it mainly 
supported African nations who were seeking independence. China helped them by 
providing military assistance, arms and training to selected African nations. After 
several African nations had secured their independence during the 1960s and 1970s, 
China´s policies shifted towards more conventional military cooperation, which meant 
high level visits, arms sales and joint-military exchanges. From the 1990s onwards, the 
pivotal point of China´s security policy in Africa has been the United Nations 
peacekeeping work, which has become the main part of China´s security policy in 
Africa. More recently, while China´s presence in the continent has grown, so has the 
number of Chinese citizens and economic interests. This has led China to take an 
initiative to protect its interests by actively participating in the fight against Somali 
piracy in the Gulf of Aiden and near waters. As the number of Chinese have soared, so 
has the need to secure their safety, meaning that the protection of its own citizens has 
become relevant part of China´s policy in Africa. (Shinn & Eisenmann 2012, 164-166.) 
 
During the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in summer 2018, President 
Xi Jinping gave a keynote speech on the future of China-Africa peace and security ties, 
which not only accurately demonstrates the current situation of China-Africa security 
ties but also emphasizes the direction in which China wants to lead the future of its 
cross-regional relations: 
 
 “--we will launch a peace and security initiative. China decided to set up a 
 China-Africa peace and security fund to boost our cooperation on peace, 
 security, peacekeeping, and law and order. China will continue to provide 
 military aid to the AU and will support countries in the Sahel region and those 
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 bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea in upholding security and 
 combating terrorism in their regions. A China-Africa peace and security forum 
 will be established as a platform for conducting more exchanges in this area. 
 Fifty security assistance programs will be launched to advance China-Africa 
 cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, and in areas of law and order, 
 UN peacekeeping missions, fighting piracy and combating terrorism”. (Xinhua 
 2018a.) 
The speech pinpoints the key areas of cooperation which are 1) providing military aid to 
the African Union and other regional institutions, 2) fighting terrorism in the region, 3) 
participating in UN missions and expanding China-Africa military cooperation while 
respecting African nations sovereignty and 4) establishing China Africa Security Forum. 
First ever China Africa Security Forum was organized in summer 2018, and it lasted 
two weeks. During the forum, 50 African leaders and the African Union representatives 
discussed such issues as security in Africa and Africa´s independent capacity-building 
in security. In addition, African leaders also visited PLA establishments. (Xinhua 
2018b.)  
Despite the rather “weak” past of China-Africa security ties, new more active rhetoric 
and the opening of military base is indicating a turning point towards more active 
policies. I would like to argue that Africa is shaping to become more important tool for 
China´s foreign policy and will play out far more vital role in the future. Now China 
navigates and engages in security matters through the United Nations security missions 
and through UN Security Council as it seeks more involved role in the UN.  
3.3.1. China´s peacekeeping work 
China is one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping and a strong supporter of 
the UN´s work. At the moment, China is the second largest donor of funds for the UN 
Peacekeeping missions after the United States and the largest donor of military 
personnel out of the five permanent security members. In 2019, China´s contributions 
accounted to around 15,22 % of all the funds which was around $7 billion (He 2019). 
Out of the Chinese troops that are currently deployed 85 % of them are in Africa (He 
2019). Initially, when China joined the United Nations Security Council in 1971, the 
situation was very different. At the time China was strictly against the idea of 
participating in peacekeeping operations (Shinn & Eisenman 2012, 183). The reason for 
this was, yet again, China´s stance on the non-interference which led China to consider 
the UN missions as meddling with countries’ internal affairs. While China adopted 
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more open policies towards the world, also its involvement with the UN grew more 
relaxed. While China started to finance the UN missions in 1982, the country did not 
start to take part in the peacekeeping operations until the 1990´s (Fung 2016).  
 
Chinese peacekeepers have been mainly in supportive roles which means that Chinese 
troops do not get involved in armed conflicts and they carry on supportive work such as 
hospital, infrastructure and mine clearing. The last stamp for China´s full UN 
membership came in 2013 when first time China sent out “comprehensive” UN security 
troops to Mali and in 2014 when China first time send out combat battalion to South-
Sudan with the UN mandate to protect civilians (Institute for Security and Development 
Policy 2018, 6). Traditionally, the troops China has sent out consist of engineers, 
medical teams and logisticians that are the backbone of any UN mission. These types of 
troops are generally on high value during missions as their training is costly and thus, 
they might be sparse in developing countries (Fung 2016). 
 
Despite the initial slow pace, peacekeeping has now become an important part of 
China´s foreign policy and especially Africa policy. In fact, there are multiple reasons 
why China participates in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Firstly, through 
peacekeeping China can participate in peace work and secure peace in conflict areas 
that threaten Chinese business interests and citizens. As long as Chinese projects and 
businesses keep expanding in Africa, there is bound to be more security risks. Chinese 
have been a target of hostilities multiple times and in order to avoid domestic criticism 
over involvement in Africa, China needs to protect its citizens. Secondly, peacekeeping 
missions offer invaluable experience on field and how to operate in multinational 
operations (Fung 2016). Chinese troops have relatively small amount of combat 
experience and this sort of experience is invaluable, if China ever faces military threats. 
Lastly, peace missions boost China´s reputation and status as a protector of peace while 
mitigating its defense spending. It is also a low-cost method of showing how China is 
prepared and committed to the protection of global stability. (Institute for Security & 
Development Policy 2018, 1-3.) China has been accused of growing military power and 
peacekeeping operations debunk some of these accusations (Lanteigne 2018, 3). 
 
China´s enthusiasm and commitment to participate in PKO seems to be still growing. In 
2015, President Xi Jinping promised to contribute an 8 000 troops standby force for UN 
missions (Martina & Brunnstrom 2015). During the same speech, Xi pledged $100 
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million for African Union to establish its own standby force within the following five 
years. Whilst China commits more to peacekeeping, there are growing amount of 
concerns for China. In modern warfare the line between traditional conflict and 
terrorism gets blurred and, in these situations, the Chinese mentality of non-interference 
might get contradictory (Lanteigne 2018, 5). More China gets involved, the messier 
modern conflicts get the harder it is to stay neutral. Nevertheless, China´s commitment 
to peacekeeping is now a vital part of China´s foreign and security policy.  
3.3.2. Military related human resource programs 
China and Africa engage in multilevel and multifield human resource program 
exchanges on all levels. These programs spawn from grassroots and expand to all 
different fields from farming to governance and military. In a typical program, China 
invites experts to participate in a short-term training in China or sends out its own 
experts to Africa for longer periods of time. Naturally, the amount of non-military 
related programs outweighs the military ones in numbers. (Benabdellah 2016, 21-25.)  
 
Military training between China and Africa has long roots as the training can be traced 
back to Mao´s times when China supported African revolutionary wars for 
independence (Benabdellah 2016, 24). More recently, China´s white paper on Military 
Strategy names training as one of the key areas of military co-operation between the 
Chinese military and foreign militaries. White paper pledges that “the Chinese military 
will also strengthen cooperation with related countries in personnel training, material 
assistance, equipment and technology, so as to strengthen mutual support and enhance 
respective defensive capabilities” (State Council 2015). 
 
Military training provided by China can be categorized in two ways: first is the long-
term training provided by Chinese peacekeeping forces and the second is short-term 
training provided by the Ministry of National Defense in China. Training happens in the 
field of military education, equipment maintenance and health care. Thus far at least 
Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Equatorial Guinea have received Chinese training. 
(Shinn & Eisenman 2012, 174.) Apart from conventional military training, China also 
provides training in part with military purchases. Shinn & Eiseman also speculate that 
providing pro bono military training is an effort to sell advanced weaponry (Shinn & 
Eisenman 2012, 174).  
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The second form of military training happens in conjunction with China´s peacekeeping 
efforts. While stationed for long terms in host countries, Chinese peacekeepers are also 
tasked to train locals. The vast majority of Chinese peacekeeping troops are non-combat 
units and their skills vary from engineering to medical. Even the combat forces are 
encouraged to help train local troops while stationed overseas. Such an example is 
Chinese language school that was set up for orphans in the Republic of Congo by 
Chinese peacekeepers. Chinese peacekeepers humanitarian efforts are well received by 
African leaders and locals who applause Chinese for sharing their skills. (Benadellah 
2016, 125-126.) 
 
Due to China´s adherence to the non-interference policy, military training remains an 
important form of military co-operation. The Action Plan of Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2018 states that “The two sides will expand defense and 
military personnel training. China will continue to step up training for African service 
personnel. The two sides will continue to deepen academic exchanges and cooperation 
among military academies and research institutes and will enhance cooperation on 
military medical science to improve Africa's capacity in this regard.” (FOCAC 2018.) 
For China providing free training for African militaries is a convenient way of gaining 
more positive image of China as well as building stronger military relations. It is 
probable that in the future China will engage in more military-to-military training.   
3.3.3. Arms deals  
Globally, at the moment China is the second largest producer of weapons, only behind 
the United States (Tian & Su 2020, 15), but as an arms exporter China comes only as 
the fifth largest arms supplier in the world (Wezeman et al. 2020, 2). Between 2015-
2019, out of all the Chinese exports only 16 % of exported arms were destined to Africa, 
the main export destination being Asia and Oceania. This being said, virtually every 
country in Africa has purchased weapons from China at some point and the United 
States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) names Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia as some of 
China´s key customers of weapons (DIA 2019, 108). As an interesting comparison in 
Europe only Belarus has purchased Chinese weapons. While at the moment China is 
still not a provider of major arms in Africa, it is a major provider of SALW. SALW 
refers to small arms and light weapons which typically are rifles, machine guns, rocket 
launchers and such, whereas major arms refer to missiles, fighter planes, naval ships, air 
defense systems, nuclear weapons and so on. Revenue earnings from SALW are limited 
so it is widely believed that China is selling SALW for political gain (Cordesman et al. 
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2019, 240). Overall, according to DIA China “primally conducts arms sales in 
conjunction with economic aid and development assistance to support its broader 
foreign policy goals, such as securing access to natural resources and export markets, 
promoting its political influence among host country elites and building support in 
international forums” (DIA 2019, 107). 
 
Chinese SALW came to center stage when they suddenly started to appear in all parts of 
Africa during 1990´s conflicts. It is important to be noted that many of these SALW 
where diverted from their official end-use by African states or recycled between conflict 
areas. However, China has been supplying arms for conflicting parties (Bromley et al. 
2013, 37). As earlier stated in the paragraph discussing China´s non-interference policy, 
Chinese SALW were one of the issues Western observers brought up during the Darfur 
crisis. Similar incident happened in 2008 when a Chinese weapon shipment on the way 
to Mugabe´s Zimbabwe was halted and again in 2011 when it was exposed that Chinese 
companies had offered to sell $200 million worth of arms to Muammar Gaddafi (Taylor 
& Wu 2013, 458). Both of these cases have raised concerns of who China conducts its 
arms deals with. These examples reveal how the non-interference policy plays 
prominent role also in China´s arms deals. Relatively small amount of SALW can have 
a vast impact on peace and security in Africa, while contributing to political violence in 
a way that is not proportioned with the number of arms or with the value of arms 
(Taylor & Wu 2013, 458). Africa has many fragile states and continuous instabilities 
which have left the continent vulnerable. In addition, armed militant groups and 
terrorists are a growing threat in the region and they are an active part of arms deals. 
Additionally, tracking SALW is problematic in Africa as China and other governments, 
including Western ones, conceal their SALW transactions and African countries 
themselves also do not report transactions correctly, thus more transparence is needed 
(Holtom & Pavesi 2018, 69).  
 
Officially, Chinese officials deny that they are in arms business to make money, 
however some African officials begged to differ. China also denies accusations that it 
would sell arms to conflict areas but acknowledges that Chinese arms have shown up in 
conflict zones through international arms dealers. (Shinn & Eisenmann 2012, 171-172.) 
In order to compact the effects of Chinese weapons and especially SALW in Africa, 
China has taken considerable measures to better track and control the end-usage of its 
products but there are still some improvements that need to be made (Bromley 2013, 
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54). Chinese weapons are attractive especially to developing countries as they are less 
expensive compared to many other major arms suppliers (DIA 2019, 107). At the same 
time, many consider them having lower quality and reliability. However, many Chinese 
arms deals come with enticements, such as gifts, donations and flexible payment 
methods and in addition Chinese weapons tend to have less end-use restrictions and 
they are less monitored (Cordesman et al. 2019, 237). This provides more options for 
countries that have fewer alternatives due to political restrictions or economic reasons. 
For example, the EU led arms embargos ban the sale of arms to the following African 
countries: the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Libya, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe (SIPRI n.d). Furthermore, Chinese arms 
are increasingly advanced, and the quality is improving (Chan 2016). As China gains 
more reputation as major arms supplier, it is inevitable to attract the interest in Africa 
due to its products competitive pricing and due to African nations´ challenging 
circumstances.  
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4. Data Analysis  
 
In this chapter I will introduce the data findings of this research. The findings are results 
of careful data collection, coding, recoding and analyzing. After careful consideration 
three main themes rose from the data and these themes are 4.1) Global responsibilities 
4.2) Military and 4.3.) Win-win co-operation. Main topics are then later divided under 
subcategories which fall under the main themes. Each theme is named to distinguish 
different groups but as the themes are very similar to each other, they do overlap in 
some ways. Through these themes I will introduce the main findings and observations 
and answer to the first research question of how China justifies the opening of its first 
military base. 
 
Since Chinese government decided to open military base in Djibouti, it has been utmost 
important for China to explain, and, in a way, validate, their new presence in Djibouti in 
the eyes of the world. While China keeps changing, evolving and adopting the new role 
in world arena, so does the expectations and views of the international audience. As 
China chooses to continue apply and enforce their already existing foreign policies, I 
argue that China´s only choice has been to minimize the purpose and use of military 
base in Djibouti. The concepts discussed in the earlier chapters such as: the non-
interference policy, peaceful development and BRI are closely intertwined with the 
establishment of the military base and thus with the subsequent reasoning for the 
opening.  
4.1. Global responsibilities 
 
When one starts to learn about Chinese culture one of the first thing, they learn is the 
importance of mianzi (面子) which means face or one´s reputation. For the Chinese 
losing face or reputation is far more disgraceful than in many other cultures. While 
connecting the Chinese concept of mianzi with China´s foreign policy might be far 
stretched, they do have something peculiarly similar to each other. While China´s 
assertiveness in foreign policy field is in its all-time high, the country still lacks certain 
trust and reputation among international peers. According to Pew Research Center´s 
opinion poll results globally the view of China is historically low especially in the West 
and in the countries neighboring China but the views in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
favorable towards China (Silver, Devlin & Huang 2019). Thus, one could argue that 
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China´s image is somewhat conflicting. Whilst China wants to appear as someone who 
protects peace and order, this image is challenged by China´s sometimes controversial 
actions. Earlier example of this is the South China Sea dispute, in which China does not 
appear as the champion of world peace but rather as regional hegemony seeking 
growing power.   
 
4.1.1. The non-interference policy & peaceful development 
Essentially, the cornerstone of China´s foreign policy has been peaceful development 
that entails the non-interference policy. As stated earlier, non-interference policy refers 
to policy of not meddling with another sovereign country´s affairs without countries´ or 
international bodies mandate (e.g. the United Nations or the African Union). China´s 
struggle of defining what does interfering and not interfering mean seems complicated 
and sometimes conflicting. The conflicting part presents itself clearly, when it comes to 
the case of Chinese military base. Any country opening a military base in any part of 
world signifys that there must be an existing need for it. A need that is so great that the 
said country is willing to pay millions to open and operate it on yearly basis. Whether 
such military base is for protection or offence, it always has a sort of influence seeking 
quality to it. Simply speaking, no one opens any military establishment for “storage”.  
 
While China might not want its military base to be perceived as one of seeking to 
influence, it still does so for the international audience and some commentators point 
out the opening of the base is turning point for China´s security policy (Cabestan 2019, 
15). Despite this notion, data presents that China continues to promote its policy of 
peaceful development even with the opening a military base (e.g. MFA 2017a & Sun 
2017). By promoting peaceful development China attempts to assure that its intentions 
in Djibouti, and in the region in general, are peaceful and non-aggressive in nature. 
Below quotes from People´s Daily are typical statements found from the data:  
 
 "China will not seek military interference into regional and other countries' 
 affairs and not seek military expansion --. China has long insisted on a defensive 
 defense policy”. (Yuan 2016.) 
 “Even if China wanted set up overseas bases for military purposes, the bases 
 would still be in line with China’s peaceful strategy of non-interference in other 
 countries’ domestic affairs … We will work to guarantee that our base is just 
 and legitimate, -” (People´s Daily 2016c).   
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Although opening the military base seems to contradict itself with non-interference 
policy, Barton (2018, 418) suggests that China sees this type of engagement as norm in 
the future as China moves to more flexible adaptation of non-interference policy. 
According to Barton (2018, 425) this implies that from China´s point of view opening 
military establishment with authorization of local sovereign country is still adhering to 
the non-interference policy. In the case of military base in Djibouti, data shows that 
China has emphasized in many of the statements that, in fact, the decision to establish 
was made “through friendly negotiations” between China and Djibouti (e.g. MFA 2017c, 
MFA 2015a & Zhang 2017). Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Geng Shuang 
commented the matter the following: 
 “The establishment of the Djibouti logistics support base of the Chinese troops 
 is a decision made by the two countries through friendly negotiations” (MFA 
 2017b).  
The data proves that in the viewpoint of China, the military base is in line with the non-
interference policy despite the obvious contraction as the base is established on friendly 
terms.  
4.1.2. Protector of Africa and the world 
As Voltaire once said, “with great power comes great responsibility”. Voltaire seems to 
be liking to Chinese leaders as global responsibility is one of the key elements that the 
country uses in identity building (Hoo 2018, xiv). In this light, it does not come as a 
surprise that one of the main arguments that China uses to reason the Djibouti military 
base is China´s wish to assume more global responsibility. The notion of “to better 
fulfill international responsibilities and obligations” (e.g. MFA 2015a, MFA 2015b, 
People´s Daily 2017a, Liu 2017), was reiterated in most of the articles and statements 
concerning the base. The following quote is an exemplary case: 
 
 “Governments of China and Djibouti consulted with each other and reached 
 consensus on building logistical facilities in Djibouti, -- in a bid to enable them 
 to better fulfill international responsibilities and obligations and safeguard peace 
 and stability of the region and beyond” (MFA 2016a).  
What is interesting about this notion is how China connects seemingly easily the 
opening of a military base to better fulfilling international responsibilities. While it is 
accurate, that there has been a growing amount of demands for China to take on more 
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global responsibilities by international audience (Fang & Sun 184, 2019), no one 
probably expected China to respond to these demands by establishing military base. The 
former president of United States Barack Obama reminded China that “China’s 
extraordinary development over the last two decades, that with expanding power and 
prosperity also comes with increased responsibilities” (White House 2012). With these 
demands, the West has wished China to take more active role in peacekeeping and 
responsible role in global economy not expand its military reach.  
Consequently, to China the military base is not only response for growing demands by 
the West, but also important part of China´s evolving identity. In this regard one can 
argue that, according to China, the military base is an effective response to these 
demands. As a result, Djibouti base seems to be only the beginning as China´s Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi proclaimed in 2016, that “China is willing to shoulder more 
international security responsibilities (Global Times 2016c). In similar fashion many of 
the articles had a notion that military base is essential for China to “safeguard regional 
peace and stability” (MFA 2015a, People´s Daily 2017a & Global Times 2016b). The 
following quote is from Ministry of Foreign Affairs regular press conference:  
 “What needs to be pointed out is that regional peace and stability serves the 
 interests of all countries and meets the aspirations shared by China, Djibouti and 
 other countries around the world. The Chinese side is ready and obliged to make 
 more contributions to that end”. (MFA 2015a.) 
The impression of a responsible global actor and moral world protector, that China can 
be seen building in the data, is intriguing. As stated in the earlier paragraph, the non-
interference policy is still a prominent policy principle so for China to proclaim to 
“protect the region” sounds farfetched and unlikely at least in the literal sense of it. I 
argue, that these promises are empty words used merely for rhetoric purposes to 
convince the reader for China´s peaceful intentions. Due to China´s non-interference 
policy and lack of combat experience, it seems unlikely that in the case of violent 
aggressions, China would act alone without the UN mandate. Nevertheless, China´s 
self-claim as the protector of peace is not entirely unfounded, as China does participate 
in the UN peacekeeping missions as well as in multilateral anti-piracy missions in the 
region in question.   
4.1.3. United Nations´ peacekeeping operations  
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As to be expected, due to China´s security policy in Africa being mainly focused on 
peacekeeping operations and these operations having pivot to Africa (Benabdallah 2016, 
25), it was evident from the beginning of the study that the reasons for establishing 
Djibouti military base would be closely related to the peacekeeping and the related 
activities. Thus, according to the data one of the main arguments for Chinese military 
base to be established is to better contribute to the UN peacekeeping operations (e.g. 
MFA 2015b & MFA 2017b). Apart from peacekeeping operations, the international 
operations include humanitarian rescue, ship escort, anti-piracy operations. The 
following quotes demonstrates accurately how China conveys its intentions:  
 
 “The completion and operation of the base will enable China to better perform 
 the international obligations of the UN escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and 
 Somali waters as well as humanitarian relief, --” (MFA 2017b). 
 “Established on July 11, the base was built to assist in humanitarian and 
 peacekeeping efforts in Africa and west Asia. It’s also able to engage in rescue 
 missions and naval exercises”. (People´s Daily 2017b.)  
Opening the base for the peacekeeping missions on the basis of humanitarian aid is 
crucial in order to better negate the often-unfavorable image of China and the military 
base itself. China has been under accusations that its relationship with Africa is 
neocolonial, thus peacekeeping missions and permanent military base effectively 
respond to these accusations (Barton 2018, 420). Participation to the UN missions as 
well as the base provide permanent and solid actions proving China´s non-economic 
intentions. Generally, China´s peacekeeping efforts have been welcomed by the whole 
international community (Shinn & Eisenman 2012, 186). In addition, if Xi´s promise to 
raise UN´s standby forces to 8 000 personnel is materialized, the base could potentially 
be important part of harboring the troops in the area (Wang 2015). If materialized, given 
Africa´s unstable security atmosphere that might change at any moment and if given a 
mandate, China could respond rapidly.  
Now, when it comes to peacekeeping missions and their connection to the military base. 
In the data it is consistently applied that the base is somehow involved in peacekeeping. 
Duchâtel & Shelton-Duplaix (2018, 31) even identify how China refers to it as `transit 
point´ between missions and place of origin. Though, to this date it has never been 
reported that peacekeepers would have transited through the military base (Cabestan 
2019, 10). As a matter of fact, there is no real need for transiting through the base as 
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there has never been one before either, thus the base is not necessary for peacekeeping 
missions. I argue that peacekeeping and humanitarian rescue are just used to justify and 
soften the opening of the base.  
Interestingly, at the same time as China promises to increase its participation in anti-
piracy operations in the Somali waters as well as in other international operations, 
China´s neighboring country Japan, who has had a base in Djibouti since 2011, has been 
struggling with the exact opposite. The Japanese public has been vocally against the 
Japanese military base as during the past five years piracy attacks in the Somali waters 
have dropped to one or less incidents per year (Wagner 2020). Despite declining 
numbers of piracy attacks since 2015, Japan´s Defense Ministry has decided to continue 
the operation of the base and even decided to expand to better counter Chinese presence 
in Africa (Fujiwara, 2018). Despite the non-existent piracy attacks the multilateral 
operations still continue but using this as pretext for military base seems farfetched.  
4.2. Military  
The PLA has an important role in maintaining the Communist Party of China in power 
and it must pledge its absolute allegiance to the Communist Party (Shambaugh 2002, 
11). While the PLA´s role in supporting those in power is still heavily domestically tied, 
its role is undoubtedly growing as an important tool for China´s foreign policy. In this 
sense, it has been crucial for China to incorporate the PLA as a part of foreign policy to 
ensure that the role given to the PLA is fitting with the already existing foreign policy 
and does not contradict it. If China fails incorporating the PLA and moreover its 
missions successfully, it will face criticism from international audience, and that would 
undermine China´s cause. Thus, the reasons given for the opening are decisive in how 
the world projects the opening.  
4.2.1. Support base or military base?  
In advance of the opening of the Djibouti base, Chinese leadership was well-prepared 
for the forthcoming criticism from international audience. Rumors of possible opening 
of the base had been circulating as early as 2011 (Lin & Li 2011), and every time when 
the topic of possible military base has risen, internationally voiced worries and criticism 
over the matter have been heard (e.g. Firstpost 2011). Taking into consideration that this 
was the first-time China was opening an overseas military base and tackling the 
criticism that would ensue, Chinese leadership have had to adopt new approaches and 
be prepared to respond efficiently to avoid backflash.  
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One of the strategies chosen by China has been to designate the military base as support 
base. At first, China used variety of different names to address the military base such a 
`logistical facility´ or `logistics facility´ but soon adopted `logistics support base´ or just 
shortly `support base´ (MFA 2015b & MFA 2017). Chinese officials have been strict 
and consistent to call the Djibouti base as logistical support base or the more commonly 
used short version which is support base. Although officially `support facility´ is still a 
preferred version in official occasions (Cabestan 2019, 7). Media outlets such as 
People´s Daily and Global Times were quick to follow official line after the official 
confirmation was made public, but they most commonly refer to the base as support 
base (Wang 2015).   
 
The name of the base might seem inconsequential, but it is used actively to differentiate 
Chinese military base from other foreign military bases or even from the concept of a 
military base overall. Either way, the difference is essential for China to rebut criticism 
it has received from Western media and to portray a softer image of itself. To better 
convey the message to international audiences, series of articles were published to 
explain the difference between China´s military base and others. Global Times (Liu 
2016) published the following to comment from Chinese military expert to illuminate 
the difference: 
 
 “Our base in Djibouti is not a military base. Unlike the US and Japan, our base 
 has no weapons stores. It's a logistics supply base which offers food, fresh water, 
 medicine, and relief materials like tents” (Liu 2016).  
Global Times also quoted PLA Daily on the topic: 
 “According to a contract signed in December 2015, the base will be able to hold 
 10,000 people, charged with protecting the region's economic and business 
 interests. It cannot, however, harbor any military ships, and it falls short on 
 target, function and scale for being a military base” (Global Times 2016a).  
Despite the significance of the distinction for China, Chinese officials have not wished 
to clearly define the actual differences other than stating that it will not harbor any 
tactical arms, nor does it have many of the tasks of fully functioning military base. 
Furthermore, the main task of the base is portrayed to be only to supply fuel and other 
supplies for escort missions and such (e.g. Sun 2017, Mo 2017 & MFA 2016a). From 
China´s point of view, it is not an operational base, but more like a storage for supplies 
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and a resting spot. Regardless of China´s efforts to soften their image and push 
everyone to use the name “support base”, every single article, academic or media, refers 
to China´s base as a military base and the negative attitudes of the Western press have 
not diminished significantly since the announcement of the military base.  
Peculiarly, in similar manner but far more successfully, Japan, the country that officially 
does not have an operational army but has Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), has quietly 
opened a military base in Djibouti as mentioned briefly earlier. Initially, China modeled 
their base according to the Japan´s defense facility and followed Japan´s example of 
portraying it as a supply facility (Cabestan 2019, 6). However, Japan´s base houses 
under 200 military personnel and they also participate in the anti-piracy operations 
which is a vast difference compared to China´s base that can house up to 10 000 
soldiers. Japan´s base has been rather unnoticeable and barely no one outside of Japan is 
even aware of its existence despite Japan´s controversial war history.  
4.2.2. Comparing to the United States and the West 
China´s and the United States´ power rivalry in all possible arenas is known for anyone 
who has read any newspapers recently. Each side attempts to come in first over the 
other in all possible arenas from innovation to science, except world hegemony which 
China claims to be not interested (e.g. Global Times 2015a). This said, Chinese media 
has a distinct way of comparing itself and the United States and other powerful 
countries. In some cases, it is rather reasonable and elaborating but more often it just 
seems a little unnecessary.  
 
As stated earlier, China has been fast to point out how their military base is not to be 
compared with other foreign ones. This is highlighted in many statements and articles 
by pointing out how the United States´ Camp Lemonier and the other foreign military 
bases in Djibouti house strategic weapons and conduct military training which is 
something that the Chinese military base will not do (Liu 2017 & People´s Daily 2016a). 
Global Times (2017a) article entitled as “PLA Djibouti base must be viewed 
objectively” elaborates how China differentiates itself from others: 
 
 “However, this base is different from the overseas military bases of other big 
 countries. For example, the US' military bases overseas are usually tasked with 
 maintaining a military presence and military deterrence for the region and serve 
 to support US hegemony around the world. The US has stationed 4,000 military 
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 personnel in Djibouti, and deployed P-3C patrol aircraft and F-16 fighter jets 
 there. It is a military outpost for the US to exert influence on Africa. -- The US 
 military base in Diego Garcia focuses on the Indian Ocean and projects deterrent 
 effects for a wider area. Owning this kind of overseas base is beyond China's 
 scope for this generation. The West shouldn't speculate this way”. (Global Times 
 2017a.) 
Statements, like the one above, are essential for China to ensure that their policy of 
peaceful development is getting through to all parties involved. This is not only an 
important message to Western nations but might be even more important to African 
leaders. I claim that through this message China seeks to assure African leaders that 
China will stay away from African affairs unlike its rival the United States. This 
continues the discourse of distinguishing China and African nations from the West and 
portraying itself as true friend of Africa. This way China places itself as the advocate of 
developing countries against the West and portrays itself as a trustworthy partner. The 
following quote is from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regular press conference:  
 “It is reported that the US have hundreds of military bases around the globe as 
 well as over ten aircraft carriers and its military spending will keep increasing, 
 yet at the same time it makes irresponsible remarks on and finds fault with 
 China's normal national defense building. This reminds us of a Chinese idiom 
 "the high-handed magistrates are free to burn down houses, while the common 
 people are forbidden even to light lamps", which is out-and-out double 
 standard.” (MFA 2017c.)  
While China has been claiming that there are fundamental differences between Chinese 
and the rest of the military bases, the reality is conflicting. As it stands today, Chinese 
base might not be the largest in size, but it can house up 10 000 soldiers and officers 
which makes it the largest military base in manpower in Djibouti (Barton 2018, 425).  
At the moment, there are around 2 000 Chinese soldiers stationed in the base (Cabestan 
2019,7). This number far surpasses the troops stationed in Italian and Japanese military 
bases. In addition, Chinese base´s original pier has been renovated to better answer the 
needs of the PLAN (Liu & Yin 2018) and now it can harbor any PLAN ship (Chan 
2017). In addition, according to satellite pictures China has been building a secret 23 
000 square meter underground basement in the premises and it has become heavily 
fortified (Headley 2018). It is still a mystery what is it used for. Initially presented as a 
modest ‘logistical support’ and even ‘dual facility’, China’s naval base is an actual full 
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fledge military and naval base (Cabestan 2019, 8). After the accounts of the specialists 
on the field (e.g. Barton 2018 & Cabestan 2019), it is rather clear that China´s efforts to 
name the base as merely a support base has been only to better adjust and fit foreign 
policy needs. Thus, it can be concluded that China´s Djibouti base is an actual military 
base comparable to any other military base in Djibouti.  
4.2.3. China´s history in the Somali waters and practical challenges  
Initially, when the speculations over the possible opening of the first military base 
started, Chinese officials were fast to point out that Chinese military had already 
established itself in the region since 2008 (e.g. MFA 2015b, Yuan 2016 & Ai 2016). 
This was then continuously reiterated in the data by presenting the numbers of missions 
conducted in the area. The mission numbers shown were presented in similar manner as 
China places itself historically in Africa discussed in Chapter 3. In this manner China 
grounds its commitment and presence in the area. 
 
Nonetheless, the years of presence or `history in the waters´ lay the groundwork for the 
military base. De facto, many articles stated how the PLA had been struggling to refuel 
and replenish soldiers due to not having their own base (e.g. MFA 2015b, People´s 
Daily 2016a & Global Times 2016a). One mission to Horn of Africa can last up to 120 
days and that is a long time to stay in the sea without proper resting facilities (People´s 
Daily 2016a). Struggles seem to be legitimate, as in 2010 when the French forces had to 
rescue Chinese sailors from the sea after an engine failure (Chan 2019). Nevertheless, 
struggles were reiterated in almost every article and statement and they often 
emphasized the wellbeing of soldiers was at stake. The following is from Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs press conference (MFA 2015b): 
 
 “In accordance with relevant UN resolutions, China has deployed over 60 
 vessels to the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in 21 escort 
 missions since 2008. In the process of escorting, we encountered real difficulties 
 in replenishing soldiers and resupplying fuel and food and found it really 
 necessary to have nearby and efficient logistical support”. (MFA 2015b.) 
The issues China have had during their naval missions sound legitimate and logical, and 
no doubt that the military base will be helpful in order to better supply and replenish 
PLA forces in the region. However, what the articles fail to inform is that China have 
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had to have longstanding agreement with Djibouti for naval port visits and that the 
PLAN have had regular port visits in Djibouti since 2003 (Duchâtel & Duplaix 2018, 6).  
 
4.3. Win-win cooperation  
 
As already discussed in the earlier chapters, Chinese foreign policy in Africa is tightly 
connected to its economic policies and in this sense, it is not startling that to China its 
military base in Djibouti is closely embedded to its economic interests. While economic 
reasons were not emphasized as much as the previous themes in the data, I claim that 
the economic interests are as important as the previous ones. The following chapter has 
been divided into two parts: one contributing Chinese interests and the second one 
contributing to Djibouti´s interests. 
4.3.2. Protection of Chinese interests 
According to research results, China´s growing interests in Africa was one of the 
starting catalysts for establishing military base in Djibouti (Ai 2016). Over the years, 
Africa´s rich natural resources have attracted state-owned and private Chinese 
businesses to establish themselves in all parts of Africa. While many of them are in 
areas that other businesses have shunned away due to security concerns or deemed it too 
insufficiently cost-effective, some companies have had to invest in countries and areas 
out of political reasons (Barton 2018, 415). Rewards have been high but so have been 
the risks as well. According to some estimates, there could be even around one million 
Chinese in Africa (The Economist 2013) and with forever expanding businesses the 
amount could be even higher.  
 
Apart from protecting Chinese civilians, Chinese interests also include the commercials 
interests themselves, BRI projects and valuable shipments between African and China. 
With military base presence, it is evident that China is now keen to show its capability 
of protecting both its citizens as well as commercial interests (Barton 2018, 416). As 
China´s interests in Africa and in the region grow, the base will become essential part of 
the logistical network. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi commented on the sidelines of 
the annual session of national congress in 2016 the following: 
 
 “China is trying to build necessary infrastructure and logistical capacities in 
 regions with a concentration of China´s interests, which is reasonable, logical 
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 and consistent with international practices. -- Rather we want to pioneer the 
 Chinese way of protecting overseas interests, one that is in tune with the trend of 
 the times and welcomed by other parties”. (People´s Daily 2016b.) 
The following statement is commonly used in the data and it highlights how China 
needs to better protect their assets: 
 “Between the western edge of the Gulf of Aden and the entrance to the Red Sea, 
 connecting the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea, Djibouti serves as a 
 crucial point in China's "One Belt and One Road" initiative. China is investing 
 billions of dollars into construction projects in the country, including railways, 
 airports and harbors. Establishing a support facility there meets the need to 
 safeguard Beijing's own interests”. (Ai 2016.)  
As China´s stakes in Africa get higher, so does the country´s pressure to prove that it 
can protect its citizens and interests. If China fails to do so, it will undermine Chinese 
Communist Party regime´ legitimacy and even more so if it needs to rely on other 
powers (Pham 2013, 45). In addition, insecurity in the continent would seriously 
hamper businesses´ enthusiasm to operate in the unstable areas of Africa. Fears are not 
unprecedented as there has been numerous threats and incidents involving Chinese 
nationals (Barton 2018, 415). Most recently, three Chinese nationals died in a mine 
attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo in April 2020 (Reuters 2020).  
4.3.3. Economic benefits for Djibouti  
While the following arguments are not direct reasons that China have used as reasoning 
for the establishing of a military base, they are still relevant part for understanding of 
how China perceives and connects its military base to wider foreign policy making. 
While these arguments are less used, they still have an important message. These 
arguments also provide interesting insights to China´s public diplomacy that aims to 
maintain only positive image of China (Hartig 2016, 661). As China´s economic 
interests in Africa and Djibouti are important for China, I argue that China portrays the 
military base as sort of “business booster” with a mission to advance business between 
China and Djibouti. Thus, the research results reveal that China connects the military 
base with deepening business opportunities between the two countries (Hu 2017, Hu 
2016 & People´s Daily 2017a). Foreign Ministry´s spokesperson Geng Shuang goes as 
far as to say that the new military base will enhance Djibouti´s economic and social 
development (MFA 2017b). In addition, Global Times article even hints that since 
57/84 
Djibouti has already Western military bases in the country, so in order to better attract 
foreign investments, Djibouti should diversify its partners to attract more foreign 
investments (Hu 2016). This is a clear indication to other countries considering letting 
China to open military base on their ground that a Chinese base on the ground brings 
investments to the host country and thus has far more positive outcomes than negative 
ones. Later after the opening of the base, Global Times (Li 2018) published an 
interview with local businessman to confirm the new arrival of businesses to Djibouti:  
 
 “Since the Chinese Navy established the base in Djibouti last summer, more 
 Chinese companies have come to the country to do business, Ahmed Mohamed 
 Arab, an investment and marketing official at the East Africa Bank. When 
 investing in a foreign country, security is always a big concern. China's first 
 overseas logistic base in Djibouti gives Chinese businessmen more confidence 
 in making long-term investment," Arab said. We also felt more secure and 
 confident to do business with Chinese companies because they are well taken 
 care of in the country," he added”. (Li 2018.) 
The connection between blossoming business between China and Djibouti due to 
military base seem unorthodox, but for China it is relevant to present the possible 
positive effects of having a base in country. It seems that as the Djibouti base will 
hardly stay as the only Chinese overseas military base in the future, the positive effects 
observed in Djibouti might help China in future negotiations with other countries when 
considering opening a base.  
Lastly, the special relation between China and Djibouti goes hardly unnoticed from 
anyone who follows China-Djibouti relations. Throughout the data, it is indicated that 
the military base is a direct result of “friendly relations between China and Djibouti” 
(e.g. MFA 2015b, MFA 2017b & Zhang 2017) as mentioned earlier. Below statement 
summarizes it well: 
 “China and Djibouti enjoy traditional friendship. Friendly cooperation between 
 the two sides has achieved constant growth over recent years, with practical 
 cooperation carried out in various field” (MFA 2015a). 
There seems to be distinct reasons for “friendly relations” to be emphasized so 
frequently. Firstly, the wording suggests the equal nature of relations between China 
and Djibouti which tries to demonstrate that China has not coerced Djibouti to allow a 
Chinese military base on its territory and that the military base is a natural consequence 
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of the long-lasting relationship. It is essential for China´s Africa policy that no matter 
size of the country, every country is treated equally. Secondly, China´s actions in the 
continent has been plagued and accused of severe corruption (Knowledge@Wharton 
2019). While China has not been accused of buying Djibouti´s military cooperation, it 
seems that China wants to assure its intentions are not seen in this light. Global Times 
elaborates on the topic the following:  
 “China's support base in Djibouti is of course an important component of 
 China's friendship with Djibouti, but the main direction of bilateral ties is 
 economic cooperation, which has always been overlooked by Western 
 observers. China has no intention of using its investment as bait in  exchange for 
 military cooperation, --”. (Hu 2017.) 
For a small poor country, Djibouti has landed a quite a number of large projects with the 
financing help of China. In addition, large part of them have only started after the 
PLAN started to take part in anti-piracy mission and started to do regular port calls in 
Djibouti (Cabestan 2019, 2). While it might seem likely, that there is a relation between 
economic investments and the military base deal with China, it is something that is not 
possible to speculate merely on articles or past Chinese dealings in Africa. Nevertheless, 
Djibouti is a clearly benefitting from China-Djibouti relations with largescale 
infrastructure projects and long list of other projects as well.   
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5. Discussion 
 
In the previous analysis chapter, I introduced the main findings of this study. While the 
previous chapter introduced the data in a more detailed manner, the aim of this chapter 
is to widen the topic and create wider connections between the themes and findings as 
well as with China´s foreign policy. Most importantly it will be determined how well 
the findings correspond with the remaining two research questions. One of the reasons 
why the case study, as a research design, was chosen was its premise of open angle 
towards the data. This enabled to conduct study without prior established themes or any 
guiding structures. In the start of the study it was not evident how the research would 
progress as there were no prior results or expectations to be compared with. As China´s 
first overseas military base in Djibouti is still not well-researched topic and there is no 
comparable research done with similar data, thus the results can be described as unique 
in themselves but as witnessed in the previous chapter the findings are actually closely 
aligned with the themes of China´s foreign policy. This was not intended result at all but 
themes and subcategories, quite obviously and naturally, had a strong correlation with 
China´s foreign policy.   
5.1. Growing military presence in Africa 
 
There are varying reasons for China to push for such an active policy in Africa although 
the most prominent reason being the economic one. With China´s competitive win-win 
co-operation China has won over African leaders and increased its business 
opportunities. With the growing number of Chinese citizens in Africa protecting the 
assets and citizens in Africa is a much larger task than the Chinese government 
probably initially anticipated. The stakes are high for China, who has pushed companies 
to enter unstable business environments that are potentially unstable and sometimes 
even dangerous. 
 
As shown in the analysis chapter, the reasoning for the opening of the military base 
from a military perspective is conflicting. First of all, according to the data one of the 
main arguments of opening the base has been the notion that the Djibouti base is 
actually only a support base. Belittling the purpose of the base and giving conflicting 
statements of the reasons behind the establishment are meant to direct the opinions of 
the readers and the rest of the world. In other words, it is to soften the image and impact 
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of opening a military base. This sort of “image control” is not a new technique to China, 
although its positive results will stretch only to certain extent and with more military 
bases in the future, it will be more difficult to employ again. Unlike in China, the 
international audience, and especially Western one, is accustomed to do the evaluating 
themselves and do not necessarily take everything in a face value, especially when 
coming from a foreign government. China needs to be more aware of how potentially 
damaging this sort of discourse is for building the basis for responsible power, if that is 
what China truly desires to be.  
 
Thus, continuing with the discourse of “Djibouti base is only support base” seems futile 
as there are no significant differences between an actual military base and Chinese 
support base. Djibouti base has already all the capabilities that a “real” military base has, 
and the base can house up to 10 000 men which makes it potentially the largest military 
base in Djibouti. With the already finished upgrades of the docking area, the only 
“missing” aspect of the base, is the lack of long landing strip for military planes, the 
existing one is only suitable for drones and helicopters. From this perspective, it is 
correct to determine that the Chinese base is an actual military base that is capable of 
conducting military operations similarly to any other military base in Djibouti or 
anywhere else. 
 
Another important observation that needs to be noted is how all the official statements 
and the data overall seem to avert away from discussing China´s future aspirations 
connected with the base and the possibilities that the base is giving for military purposes. 
Naturally, some of this information would not be disclosed for the public but even 
general remarks would ease the tensions and correct the conceptions that the military 
base has brought out. To begin with, the strategic position of Djibouti is the reason why 
the number of other military bases in the area is high so there is no denying that China 
would have not chosen it for the same reasons as any other country in Djibouti.  
Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that China´s participation in anti-piracy 
operations regularly has proven to be difficult without a military base in the region and 
in this sense Djibouti as a location is reasonable. Although with the decline of piracy 
activity in the region, China might need to adjust their reasoning if they want to use 
piracy for reasoning for its presence in the region.  
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Based on this study it is probable that China will open more military bases in the future 
as well. As mentioned earlier Africa is working as a testing ground in a sense for China 
to further develop its policies. With a similar line of thought, China is now 
experimenting on how to operate a military base and how to handle it diplomatically 
without further angering the international audience. Finally, the most important is how 
to fit the military base in the discourse of non-interference and the larger frame of 
foreign policy. Choosing Africa as the first location of the base, was a wise decision 
from strategic point of view. It is well known that at the moment Africa, with its long-
lasting wars and growing terrorism threats, is the most tumultuous continent. This has 
resulted in a situation where most of the active UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) are 
in Africa. Thus, justifying the military base location in Africa with China´s active 
participation in PKO is reasonable, even if at the moment the base is actually not used 
for the operations. Opening the base with similar reasoning in the future will be harder 
as there is no similarly convenient location at hand apart from opening another one in 
some part of Africa.  
5.2. The role of global actor 
 
While China is facing the difficult task of persuading the international audience of its 
peaceful intentions, country´s actions, not only in Africa but also throughout Asia, have 
been under a microscope. China´s actions especially in the South China Sea have led to 
widening mistrust between China and the rest of the world. As a balancing force for the 
negative image it has gained, China has invested heavily in its contributions for UN 
peacekeeping operations which are undeniably important and should not be discredited. 
Participating in the peace operations is a great objective if China truly wants to become 
a responsible global actor. Sending peacekeepers on missions has its own risks but in 
the case of China the benefits outdo the risks which have been greatly appreciated by 
the UN. Thus, from China´s point of view the country´s active support of peacekeeping 
operations is seen as an answer for the demands of the international audience and 
especially an answer for the demands of the African nations. Clearly, this was not 
enough for China and military base was needed. Certainly, the growing demands of the 
international audience did not demand opening a military base. Naturally, only time will 
truly tell what the underlying reasons for establishing the base were but most certainly 
building -yet- another military base in already demanding military environment is 
complicating the situation in the Horn of Africa. 
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To become a global actor China needs to do more. Contributing to peacekeeping is not 
enough to claim a global player role as when the role grows larger more difficult issues 
will come forth. In those cases, just offering economic support will not be enough to 
solve the complicated issues in different countries with different cultures. To become 
truly a responsible actor, China needs to make some radical changes to its policies. 
Transparency is something where it would be easy to start with. Whether it is soft loans 
or the underlying reasons for the military base, the cloud of mystery is still surrounding 
many of China´s actions which then hinder China´s goal of claiming the seat of a 
responsible actor. With more transparent actions, international circles would be more 
understanding towards China.   
 
The non-interference policy is evidently changing and transforming that can be seen in 
China´s actions in Africa. While it is unlikely that China will abandon the non-
interference policy anytime soon, it can be predicted that its definition has already 
extended from its original meaning, the military base itself is a proof of that. While 
China tries its best to maintain that everything is business as usual, the reality is far 
from the neutral atmosphere China aims to create. From this perspective China´s 
growing role in the world is alarming as no one can accurately know what China´s 
ultimate long-term goals are. 
 
On the other hand, there is China´s win-win co-operation that is still one of the driving 
forces behind China´s Africa policy. Connecting the military base with China´s 
economic interests was intriguing. The protection of Chinese interests was mentioned in 
multiples entries although the question still remains that how the protection of interests 
would happen in reality. Rescue missions and anti-piracy operations apart there is little 
space where China can maneuver, if let´s say rebels attack a Chinese mine and take 
hostages which is a feasible scenario. Nevertheless, as the number of Chinese citizens 
and business grow, the need for even symbolic presence and protection of interests is 
necessary to satisfy citizens’ concerns. More importantly, the connection between 
economic interests and security seems strong in China. If economic interests work as 
solid reasoning for a military base, the next new location of the possible military base 
could be anywhere as China´s economic relations extend to all parts of the world.  
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5.3. Conflicting policies  
 
At the start of this study, there were no pre-established themes nor categories to 
compare with although it was soon apparent that in the end the themes were closely 
connected with already existing themes of China´s foreign policy. My presumptions 
were not correct and certain themes that felt obvious and important at the beginning 
were not relevant in the end. It was surprising how closely the whole opening a military 
base overseas has just followed the already settled path of China´s foreign policy. Then 
again, why would it not? The responses of the Foreign Ministry were deliberated and 
neutral and left little for speculation. They repeated the same formula from almost word 
to word when the topic of the military base was brought out. Commonly occurring 
outbursts during weekly press conferences were kept at a minimum and it seemed that 
the topic was almost muted in some sense. According to my previous experience of 
China, typically when China has something important to announce in any way possible 
it is quite common that to the topic is brought out consistently. In this case, there were 
plenty of articles, but they felt much shorter and less opinionated compared to some 
typical announcement of “progress” that was made by China. Maybe this was due to the 
lack of available information because of the sensitivity of the topic or maybe it was due 
to less unwanted negative opinions. Especially surprising was the rather neutral writing 
style of Global Times which is notorious of its bigoted pieces.  
 
It is clear that the policy and reality of the military base in Djibouti are quite different. 
While China has attempted to avert from excessive publicizing of the base and diverting 
opinions of the public, it tries to cover the fact it is a full-blown military base. What I 
suggest is that if one solely relies on the official statements it might seem that military 
base is there to actually bring peace to Africa when in reality it is much more. What the 
opening of the base has exposed, is how China faces some challenges within its own 
policies which it has yet to resolve. The whole concept of China having an overseas 
military base is evidently not very fitting with China´s most important policy of non-
interference and only naming the base with a different name will not diminish the role 
foreign military base has within a foreign country. The opening of the base is further 
evidence for the change in China´s foreign policy that everyone has been witnessing for 
already a long period of time. 
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According to my predictions, the incompatibility of China´s foreign policy and security 
policy will continue to grow in the future as more bases will appear. China´s Djibouti 
base is a clear indication that China is not only changing its security policy but most 
importantly its foreign policy as well. As China continues to defend military 
installments with the pretext of non-interference, the policy might eventually lose its 
meaning altogether. When it does, hopefully by then the now conflicting identity of 
China will be clearer and more defined. Opening of the base was a decisive point in the 
development of China´s foreign policy and the reasonable success of it going under 
radar has most probably boosted the assertiveness of China. It will be seen later in the 
future if China´s Djibouti base will be a prototype of future bases.    
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6. Conclusion 
 
China´s transformation from one of the poorest countries in the world to the 
powerhouse it is today has been nothing short of remarkable. While country´s economic 
achievements are exceptional, its actions on the foreign policy arena have left some 
researchers to question the motives behind China´s actions. After Party Secretary Xi 
Jinping took the position of the highest officer of the country, China´s traditional role as 
a mere observer have changed to a proactive participant in the world politics. China´s 
transformation have been keenly observed all around the world and much have already 
been written about it. The topic of rising China is debated vigorously and with this 
research I wanted to participate in the wider the debate on China´s changing foreign 
policy. To better understand the changes of the policy, a case study of the establishment 
of China´s first overseas military base in Djibouti was chosen. Djibouti base is an 
excellent example of China´s newfound assertiveness as well as it demonstrates the 
change that is taking place within China´s foreign policy. While there is no doubt about 
the importance attach to it, due to its relative newness there are hardly any academic 
works about the topic. 
 
The aim of this study has been to answer three research questions. Firstly, how does 
China reason the opening of its first overseas military base in Djibouti. Secondly, how 
does the reasoning project China´s changing foreign policy and finally, what possible 
implications it might have for the future. In order to answer these questions, case study 
was chosen as research design and the data was progressed with qualitative content 
analysis. Case study as a research design allowed the study to be conducted without 
prior themes or categories. This gave an open-minded angle for the study and led to less 
biased results. The official statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were chosen 
as the primary data for the research. In addition, due to the limited number of official 
statements, articles from People´s Daily and Global Times were also added as primary 
sources. Both of these newspapers are strongly connected to the Communist Party of 
China and thus they present the official party policy. The addition of People´s Daily and 
Global Times articles brought more nuanced data that correlated with the goals of the 
study perfectly. While the results of the content analysis were unique in themselves, the 
results still closely followed the established discourse of China´s foreign policy. The 
analysis resulted in three different themes from which the focal points of the results and 
China´s foreign policy were discovered. The results yielded sometimes conflicting 
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reasoning which displayed the active change China is going through within its policy 
making.   
 
Firstly, for China the military is closely knitted with its policy of non-interference and 
the military base is debated to be a step towards of becoming a responsible actor in 
global affairs and a vital part of its peacekeeping operations. This result showed how 
China intends to build an image of protector of world peace by increasing its presence 
in Africa and the wider area. Reassuring that China´s non-interference policy is still 
relevant even after building military base in overseas portrayed to be challenging. 
Convincing the relevance of non-interference is vital for China to gain trust of the 
international community and its key partners. Secondly, due to the conflict between the 
non-interference policy and establishing a military base, China has resulted to downplay 
the usage of the military base by calling the base as a support base. Claims of support 
base were supported by China´s claims of difference between Chinese and Western 
military bases. In reality, there are no significant differences between Chinese and 
Western military bases. Thirdly, China connects the base closely with its economic 
interests in Africa. While the connection is ambiguous, through the base China aims to 
protect its citizens and economic interests. At the moment this is mainly achieved 
through rescue missions and peacekeeping work. On the other hand, according to China 
the base brings new business opportunities to Djibouti and helps with the development 
of Djibouti.  
 
Overall, the opening of a military base has resulted in considerable amount of negative 
reactions which has pushed China to attempt to control how the world, and especially 
Western world, views China´s actions. This has been achieved by distorting the 
reasoning of the base and blurring the lines of military instalment and peacekeeping 
operations center. China´s aim of becoming a responsible actor was favorably used to 
justify the base. At the moment, it seems that combining military advancement and non-
interference policy is conflicting while China explores its new more assertive foreign 
policy. Despite the past and current actions, it seems unlikely that China would abandon 
the non-interference policy altogether but certainly the meaning of it has and will 
further develop in the future. What can be taken from this study is that the Djibouti base 
is only a testing place for Chinese style military base and most probably there will be 
more bases in the future. While a military base itself does not prove that China will one 
day start to seek hegemony, the military base´s existence cannot be just shrugged off or 
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understated. According to my predictions, the incompatibility of China´s foreign policy 
and security policy will continue to grow in the future as more bases will eventually 
appear.  
 
While the results of this study have been satisfactory more study is needed to get more 
comprehensive take on the topic. A clearly missing part of this study is the military 
perspective which would have yielded in more nuanced results. Thus, the addition of the 
original China´s Ministry of National Defense´s press releases might bring out different 
outcome which at the moment are no longer available. Also, adding PLA´s official 
media sources would have been interesting as well. On the other hand, doing 
comparison between English language and Chinese language sources might be have 
brought entirely different aspect to the topic. Acquiring any different type of sources for 
the study, other than news media, would be challenging due to the topic´s sensitivity.  
 
The topic of Chinese military base will certainly be vital in years to come. I am 
personally interested to see how China copes and adjusts its reasoning in the case of 
future bases considering how Djibouti has had many advantages compared to other 
locations. In similar manner the development, or the change, of the non-interference 
policy is going to be critical and have wide ranging effects on world politics. While 
China´s assertiveness grows, its foreign policy will adopt to much larger demands. 
When these changes take place, world should be better prepared. 
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